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ABSTRACT
The positive stock price reaction associated with the 
announcement of a corporate spinoff is we11-documented but 
not yet explained. This work offers a new hypothesis: 
investor sentiment may affect the market response to the 
announcement of a spinoff. The results of an investigation 
using market-oriented proxies for investor sentiment 
support this hypothesis. Results of an analysis using non- 
market proxies for investor sentiment are not consistent 
with the above hypothesis. An analysis of the long-term 
effects on shareholder wealth of spinoffs is also 
conducted. It is found that pre and post-spinoff 
performance cannot be considered (statistically) 
significantly different.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
During the decade of the 1980's, there was a marked 
increase in the frequency of events that are generally 
referred to as corporate restructuring. This decade is 
notable as a period of vigorous merger activity, 
reminiscent of the merger "wave" of the late 1960's, 
resulting in an acceleration in the pace of change in the 
ownership structure of U.S. corporations. Less well- 
publicized, however, is a parallel trend in the number of 
corporate divestitures.
As is often the case, this market activity has 
inspired renewed academic interest in the restructuring 
issue. Specifically, over the past few years, the merger 
and LBO phenomena have come under intense scrutiny. Less 
well-examined, however, are issues regarding those types of 
reorganization that result in a smaller corporate entity.
In particular, although the corporate merger has been the 
focus of a number of dissertations and countless academic 
articles, the "demerger" or spinoff has received far less 
attention.
While a merger creates one firm where before there 
were two, the spinoff reverses this procedure and produces 
two separate corporate entities from one. In a typical 
spinoff a large conglomerate divests one of its 
subsidiaries, often one in a different industry than that 
of the parent. However, the business unit spun off is not
1
2always an existing subsidiary; it is sometimes a collection 
of heretofore unrelated assets, grouped for the express 
purpose of forming a segment to be divested. Also, 
occasionally more than one subsidiary or operating segment 
is spun off, and a spinoff is sometimes only one element of 
a much larger corporate restructuring.
The operations of each business unit of the newly 
divided firm typically remain unchanged. Although the spun 
off segment of the corporation becomes an independent firm, 
the constituent components of this demerger are still 
related through common ownership. This is so because the 
pre-spinoff shareholders of the parent organization receive 
a pro-rata share of the spun off corporation's equity.
This continuity of ownership differentiates spinoffs from 
other types of divestitures, which generally involve an 
exchange of the firm's assets for cash or other means of 
compensation.
On average, divestitures seem to elicit a positive 
stock price reaction from the market on the day(s) on which 
the restructuring is announced (for example, see Rosenfeld, 
(1984) and Zaima and Hearth, (1985)). Shipper and Smith
(1983) report a two-day cumulative return of approximately 
3.0% for a sample of spinoffs that took place between 1963 
and 1981. Various explanations for this market reaction to 
the announcement of a spinoff have been advanced.
Nevertheless, to date none has proved completely 
satisfactory explanations of the spinoff phenomenon.
An early hypothesis to explain the observed positive 
shareholder wealth effects of spinoffs is bondholder 
expropriation. Underlying the expropriation hypothesis is 
the notion that a spinoff involves a wealth transfer 
between the firm's securityholders rather than an increase 
in firm value. In this view, the shareholders are thought 
to "steal" a portion of the bondholder's collateral by 
dividing the firm and reducing the assets to which the 
bondholders have claim. Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper 
and Smith (1983) reject this hypothesis, however, by 
demonstrating 1) that the spun off subsidiary is typically 
assigned a proportionate amount of the corporation's total 
debt, and 2) that bond prices and ratings are usually 
unaffected by the announcement of a spinoff.
Currently, the specialization hypothesis is probably 
the most widely accepted explanation regarding the stock 
price reaction to corporate spinoffs. This argument 
emphasizes managerial focus, and is rooted in the 
transactions cost theory of the firm associated with the 
work of Coase (1937). Diseconomies of decision-making are 
assumed to arise once the firm reaches some unspecified 
critical size and are exacerbated if there exist 
subsidiaries that operate in different industries than the 
parent. A divestiture of one or more of the subsidiaries
allows the executives of each business segment to better 
manage the resources of the separate firms. This argument 
may be viewed as the converse of the synergy explanation in 
the merger literature and the two share a common problem in 
empirical testing: the difficulty of formulating refutable
hypotheses that are sufficiently distinct.
Other explanations regarding the shareholder wealth 
effects of spinoffs offered in the divestiture literature 
include the regulatory hypothesis, the union hypothesis, 
and the merger hypothesis. (Hite and Owers, (1983) and 
Schipper and Smith, (1983)). The first rationale posits 
escape from some type of regulatory interference as 
creating the wealth resulting from the divestiture. The 
union hypothesis suggests that labor union containment 
(dividing the firm into union and non-union segments) may 
be beneficial to shareholders. Finally, it appears that 
some firms spinoff a subsidiary to facilitate a merger 
between the spun off firm and a third corporation. These 
three hypotheses appear to motivate a number of the 
observed spinoffs. However, the majority of demergers do 
not appear to fit into any one of these three categories. 
Given the lack of a satisfactory explanation for the 
positive wealth effects associated with the demerger 
phenomenon in the literature, it is the objective of this 
study to formulate a new hypothesis regarding investor 
reaction to a spinoff announcement.
5Since the operations of each segment of the divided 
firm usually do not change after the divestiture, the 
economic rationale motivating corporate spinoffs may be 
difficult for investors to perceive. It is possible that 
the initial reaction to this event is not based at all on 
enhanced economic value. While the long-term wealth 
effects of spinoffs may be difficult for investors to 
evaluate, the circumstances surrounding the announcement of 
the typical spinoff are such that investors could be 
overly-optimistic about the prospects of the newly divided 
firm. The hypothesis developed here and termed the 
Positive Reaction to Non-Negative Information (PRNI) 
hypothesis posits that the announcement day returns of 
spinoff firms are inflated by the optimistic expectations 
of investors.
Although the stock price reaction to the announcement 
of a corporate spinoff has been thoroughly investigated (if 
not explained), the long-term effects of a demerger on 
shareholder wealth have been the subject of few empirical 
studies. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1991) find that a 
sample of spun off subsidiaries outperform a market proxy 
and a sample of size and industry matched firms over a 36 
month holding period. While making a significant 
contribution to the divestiture literature, that study 
ignores an important aspect of the long-term effects of 
corporate spinoffs. The post-spinoff performance of parent
firms is at least as important as that of spun off 
subsidiaries, since the parent firm is typically the larger 
entity and therefore retains the bulk of the equity of the 
original corporation.
This study also investigates the long-term shareholder 
wealth effects associated with corporate spinoffs. The 
post-spinoff performance of parent firms as well as that of 
spun off subsidiaries is considered. Rather than compare 
portfolio performance to that of the market or a sample of 
"matched" firms, more traditional measures of portfolio 
performance are used. Use of the Jensen (1968), Sharpe 
(1966) and Treynor (1965) measures of portfolio performance 
should provide a more precise evaluation of portfolio risk 
and are therefore more informative regarding the long-term 
return properties of spinoff firms.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 contains a review of the relevant literature and 
a discussion of the institutional issues regarding 
spinoffs. In Chapter 3, the PRNI hypothesis is presented 
and its implications are discussed. An event study 
examining the short-term effects of spinoffs and testing 
the PRNI hypothesis are the subject of Chapter 4. The 
long-term (portfolio) effects of the spinoff are analyzed 
in Chapter 5. Finally, summary and conclusions are offered 
in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Divestitures
The spinoff is merely one method by which a firm may 
divest a portion of its total assets. Other forms of 
corporate divestiture include the splitoff, in which one or 
more shareholders of the parent firm exchange their stock 
in the parent firm for stock in the subsidiary. In a 
split-up, the parent firm is divided into several parts, 
the equity of each part is distributed among the parent's 
shareholders, and then the parent is dissolved. The most 
popular type of divestiture is the selloff, which involves 
the sale of some portion of the assets of one firm to 
another firm. In most cases, the asset becomes a 
subsidiary or division of the purchasing firm.
Virtually all of the published empirical research 
examining the wealth effects of divestiture has considered 
either selloffs or spinoffs or both. The bulk of this 
empirical evidence suggests that the announcement of a 
divestiture is generally associated with a positive stock 
price reaction for the divesting firm. An early empirical 
study examining the wealth effects of corporate divestiture 
is that of Boudreaux (1975), who investigates the stock 
price reaction to the announcement of 138 voluntary and 31 
involuntary divestitures over the period 1965-1970. For 
the sub-sample of voluntary divestitures, Boudreaux finds 
an "unusually positive" price movement for the three months
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preceding and one month following the announcement. 
Boudreaux's sub-sample of voluntary divestitures contains 
both spinoffs and selloffs; unfortunately, no attempt is 
made to distinguish differential effects (if any) between 
these two forms of divestiture.
Using daily data, Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer 
(1984) (ABK) and Hearth and Zaima (1984) restrict their 
respective samples to voluntary selloffs, and each find 
that the announcement of such an event results in positive 
abnormal returns. Consistent with the findings of the bulk 
of the divestiture literature, Hearth and Zaima find an 
upward "drift" in share price for several weeks immediately 
prior to the announcement date. In contrast, ABK report a 
negative trend in share price over the weeks prior to the 
announcement date.
Rosenfeld (1984) investigates stock price reaction 
to both selloffs and spinoffs and concludes that although 
each has a positive effect on stock price, the effect of 
the latter is larger in magnitude than the former. The 
author suggests that this difference is due to the 
different circumstances typically surrounding the two types 
of divestitures. Specifically, selloffs are often 
precipitated by poor economic performance by the parent 
firm, while this is usually not true of spinoffs.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Hearth and Zaima (1984) 
report that the announcement of a selloff by relatively
"healthy" firms has a stronger positive effect on share 
price than the same announcement by their less successful 
counterparts.
Zaima and Hearth (1985) examine the wealth effects of 
voluntary selloffs with respect to the division of economic 
gains between the divesting and acquiring firms. The 
authors conclude that while shareholders of acquiring firms 
may realize some economic gains from selloffs, the majority 
of economic gains accrue to the shareholders of divesting 
firms. Although there is some evidence of a positive price 
movement around the announcement (of acquisition) date for 
acquiring firms, there is no evidence that these price 
movements are significant. Zaima and Hearth (1985) also 
document an empirical relationship they reported elsewhere: 
the positive correlation between relative size of the 
assets divested and stock price reaction at the 
announcement date.
2.2. Institutional Issues
The typical sequence of events for a corporation 
undertaking a spinoff is as follows:
1) Management announces that it plans to 
divest a portion of the firm through a pro-rata 
distribution of new shares to shareholders of the 
parent company. Shareholder approval is sought
if required by the parent's corporate bylaws. If 
shareholder approval is required, a special 
shareholders' meeting is called. At this meeting 
(or by proxy), shareholders are asked to approve 
the plan of reorganization. The plan of 
reorganization contains details of the mechanics 
of the spinoff, including the relationship 
between parent and subsidiary during and after 
the spinoff. Any exchanges of assets and 
liabilities between parent and subsidiary that 
are part of the overall restructuring are 
included. Other items generally contained in a 
plan of reorganization are the number of shares 
of stock to be distributed, record and payment 
dates for the distribution, and the proposed 
exchange listing for the subsidiary.
2) The board of directors reviews and approves 
the plan of reorganization.
3) The company seeks and is granted a favorable 
ruling from the IRS. If the proposed spinoff meets 
the requirements of Section 355 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the distribution of the subsidiary's 
stock to the shareholders of the parent firm is 
considered a stock dividend by the IRS, and is
therefore tax-free to the recipients until the stock 
is sold. In order to qualify for tax-free status, the 
spinoff must be motivated by "business considerations" 
and not by tax avoidance. Examples of allowable 
business considerations are to expand credit for one 
or both corporations, to separate businesses to allow 
employees to share in the profits of ownership and to 
make the subsidiary's stock more acceptable in a 
merger. Note that this list is not exhaustive.
Additionally, the Tax Code requires that parent 
and subsidiary must be actively engaged in business 
for at least five years before the spinoff and that 
there exists no pre-arranged plan for all the 
shareholders to sell off the subsidiary stock after 
the distribution. Other criteria that must be 
satisfied to qualify a spinoff as a dividend include 
the directive that the distribution must constitute at 
least 80% of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary. 
Finally, any shares retained by the parent must not 
constitute "practical control" of the subsidiary. 
Failure to satisfy these conditions can result in the 
tax treatment of the spinoff shares as dividend income 
to the parent company shareholders in the year of 
receipt.
4) The shareholders approve the plan of 
reorganization.
5) The company files a registration statement 
for the subsidiary with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. A prospectus must be 
provided to all stockholders who will receive 
stock in the spinoff. The subsidiary must meet 
all reporting guidelines required by the SEC for 
publicly traded corporations.
Prior to 1969, the tax rules were the only 
regulations in place regarding spinoffs, since the SEC 
considered a spinoff a dividend, not a sale of 
securities. Therefore, the registration requirements 
for publicly traded securities under the Securities 
Act of 1933 did not apply to the equity or debt of 
spun off firms. This "loophole" in registration 
requirements led the SEC to suspect that spinoffs were 
being used to avoid the disclosures of information 
required for public corporations. In order to prevent 
possible abuses, in July 1969 the SEC issued a 
directive stating that spinoff stock should be 
registered if the shares are issued with the intent of 
resale.
13
6) The subsidiary's shares are distributed to 
the parent company's shareholders on a pro-rata 
basis. The shares are typically distributed six 
months after the initial announcement, although 
the time period between public announcement and 
completion of the spinoff may be as short as two 
months or as long as several years.
Whether or not the conversion and exercise prices of 
warrants and convertible securities are adjusted for the 
effects of the demerger depends on their terms as described 
in the corporate charter. Some firms are not required to 
adjust the terms of these securities at all. More 
typically, the parent firm modifies their terms by 
multiplying the number of shares received upon exercise or 
conversion by the ratio of the market value of the parent 
firm including the subsidiary to the market value of the 
parent firm excluding the subsidiary. The value of 
outstanding options received through a stock option plan is 
usually preserved in a similar fashion: the number of
shares obtainable at exercise is adjusted upward, and the 
exercise price downward.
Most firms that are large enough to engage in a 
spinoff have established retirement plans for the benefit 
of their employees. The subsidiary typically establishes a 
plan similar to that of the parent, into which the assets
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of employees of the spun off firm are transferred. The 
subsidiary then assumes responsibility for the unfunded 
liability of its pension plan. Years of service with the 
parent company usually count toward eligibility and 
increase the level of retirement benefits for employees of 
the spun off subsidiary.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the spinoff is 
that, on average, it seems to be a value creating event. 
That is, there appear to be gains associated with the act 
of separating one firm into two entities. This 
circumstance is especially intriguing when one considers 
that mergers are also value creating events (at least 
initially - see Jensen and Ruback, (1983)). As many 
authors point out, (for example, Hite and Owers, (1983)) 
potential synergies may well increase the aggregate market 
value of two merging firms. Since a demerger is the direct 
opposite of the merger the synergy argument cannot hold.
Abstracting from synergies and assuming frictionless 
capital markets, spinoffs that do not affect cash flows 
should not affect market value. It is probably safe to 
assume that the majority of spinoffs do not affect cash 
flows because, typically, the operations of each segment 
remains unchanged. Why then should a mere reconfiguration 
of the equity of a corporation increase the market value of 
the firm?
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2.3. Extant Hypotheses
Possible explanations include one proposed by 
Hakansson (1982), who demonstrates that if financial 
markets are incomplete, a spinoff can increase the 
opportunity set available to investors. Litzenberger and 
Sosin (1977) suggest that if there exist differential 
growth opportunities between the subsidiary and parent, a 
spinoff can provide investors with more flexibility vis-a1- 
vis the capital gains/dividends alternatives. That is, if 
the subsidiary has substantial growth opportunities while 
the parent is capable of paying a relatively high dividend, 
investors who prefer capital gains may choose to hold 
shares only in the subsidiary, and investors who prefer 
dividends will retain only the parent's stock.
Another explanation for the positive stock-price 
reaction associated with spinoffs is that value is not 
created at all, but that there is merely a wealth transfer 
from the senior security holders (debt and preferred stock) 
to the equity holders. Galai and Masulis (1976) suggest 
that with a spinoff, the stockholders may be able to "steal 
away" a part of the bondholder's collateral, since they 
(the bondholders) have no claim on the assets of the new 
firm. Naturally, this argument assumes:
1) that the bondholders are unable to foresee the
possibility of such maneuvering on the part of the 
shareholders, or
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2) that the bondholders are unable either to prevent 
spinoffs (through debt covenants) or to charge an 
appropriate rate to compensate for this risk.
In somewhat the same vein, Myers (1977) argues that 
firms with risky debt may reject positive net present value 
projects, since it is possible that some projects may 
enhance overall firm value but leave the shareholders no 
better (or worse) off. A relevant example given by Miles 
and Rosenfeld (1983) is as follows: a subsidiary has
positive net present value projects that are rejected 
because the benefits will accrue to the bondholders of the 
parent. If the subsidiary is spun off, then all the 
benefits will accrue to the shareholders of the spun off 
corporation. Thus a spinoff announcement might increase 
the value of the (parent) firm's equity by the net present 
value of these investment opportunities.
The elimination of negative synergies between the 
parent and subsidiary may serve to explain the generally 
positive reaction to spinoffs. For example, if the parent 
and subsidiary operate in disparate industries, there may 
be an advantage in allowing each firm to "stick to its 
knitting", and eliminating the managerial distraction of an 
unnatural corporate relationship. As argued by Schipper 
and Smith (1983), divesting firms may have reached the 
point of diminishing marginal returns to management. These 
firms divest to reduce the number and complexity of their 
managerial contracts. This rationale is known as the
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"specialization" hypothesis. A spinoff undertaken for 
specialization purposes may be viewed as the converse of a 
conglomerate merger.
It has been suggested in the literature that there may 
be a legal or regulatory basis for the positive stock price 
reaction generally associated with spinoffs. If the nature 
of a subsidiary's operations cause it to fall under the 
supervision of a state or federal regulatory agency, it is 
often the case that the parent’s operations are subject to 
the scrutiny of the same regulatory agency. For example, 
if a financial services holding company owns a bank as a 
subsidiary operation, the parent firm as well as the 
subsidiary bank may be forced to adhere to policies set by 
bank regulators. Another example might be the spinoff of a 
foreign subsidiary by a US corporation, which would free 
the parent from restrictions imposed by Congress on 
domestic firms that have operations abroad. There may be a 
tax advantage in spinning off a foreign subsidiary, since 
the spun off firm is required to pay corporate taxes only 
to the nation in which the company operates. If this rate 
is lower than the US corporate tax rate, the shareholders 
may benefit. Naturally, any dividends paid to US citizens 
by a foreign company are taxed at the prevailing US rate.
Similarly, a spinoff may allow a subsidiary to avoid 
burdensome obligations associated with the parent’s labor 
union. Attempting to contain union-organizing activities
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is an acceptable business purpose to spinoff a subsidiary, 
according to Section 355 of the Tax Code. The National 
Labor Relations Board and a federal appeals court have held 
that a spun off firm does not share automatically in the 
parent's collective bargaining agreements. If a spinoff is 
not solely motivated by a desire to avoid labor 
obligations, the spun off firm may be considered a "new" 
firm as far as organized labor is concerned (Schipper and 
Smith, (1983)).
Hite and Owers (1983) argue that spinoffs precipitated 
by (potential) legal or regulatory difficulties should 
decrease the value of the firm. In this case, the decision 
to spinoff is prompted by potential interference with the 
firm's desired activities. Hite and Owers (1983) maintain 
that if the combined operations of parent and subsidiary 
are optimal in an unconstrained situation, then separation 
of the two units induced by legal or regulatory impediments 
can only reduce total firm value. On the other hand, 
merger considerations may enhance the value of a firm 
executing a spinoff. It appears that rather than sell a 
subsidiary directly for cash, some firms spinoff the 
subsidiary first, and then the acquiring firm negotiates 
with the shareholders in a "partial merger". The generally 
positive stock returns to target firms upon the 
announcement of a merger might explain the positive returns 
observed upon the announcement of a spinoff.
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Another rationale for the stock price reaction to 
spinoffs found in the literature is a hypothesis advanced 
by Mauer and Lewellen (1990). Their argument is based on 
the tax circumstances of the securityholders of the firms 
involved in the spinoff. By way of exposition, Mauer and 
Lewellen (1990) offer the example of an unlevered firm that 
has asset investments in two different lines of business. 
Since these two investments are in different lines of 
business, they will have operating returns, and therefore 
market values, that are imperfectly correlated.
The market value of the combined firm will be the 
market value of its component businesses, and this value 
will fluctuate with changes in the value of each component. 
If the combined firm chooses to spinoff one of its 
component businesses and distribute the common stock of the 
new firm to its existing shareholders, investors may then 
experience (and realize) capital gains and losses from 
their holdings in each corporation.
In the post-spinoff period, the net change in 
shareholder wealth will be no different from the situation 
where the corporation remained a single entity. However, 
investors now may trade separately on the movements of the 
market values of each company. The advantage of this 
circumstance over the previous corporate structure to 
investors is the ability to realize capital losses for tax 
purposes when the market values of the two firms change in
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opposite directions. As Mauer and Lewellen (1990) point 
out, if the market value of one of the firms increases and 
the other decreases, then investors may realize the full 
loss of the latter, given separate corporate organization, 
whereas the losses of one component of a combined firm 
might be "swamped" by the gains of the other division.
Constantinides (1983) and Constantinides and Ingersoll
(1984) have shown that immediately realizing all capital 
losses in order to take the associated tax deductions (but 
deferring all capital gains) is optimal tax-trading 
behavior in an environment of fluctuating securities 
prices. Another implication of their research is that the 
ability to implement such a strategy offers to investors a 
valuable tax-timing option that may contribute 
significantly to the value of an investment in any given 
security. Consistent with option pricing models (Galai and 
Masulis, (1976)), the value of this option increases with 
the variance of the underlying security.
An argument similar to that of Mauer and Lewellen is 
presented by Sarig (1985). He demonstrates, in an Arrow- 
Debreu framework, that mergers reduce the aggregate value 
of the merging firm's outstanding securities, and 
conversely, divesting economically unrelated lines of 
business should increase the aggregate value of corporate 
securities. Sarig points out that the shareholders' 
limited liability is the principal advantage of the
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corporate form of organization. He argues that by 
combining two corporations, the shareholders have lost the 
valuable option of forfeiting their claim on the assets of 
one of the firms, should either company become insolvent. 
This option is more valuable, the author submits, when the 
returns on the two firms are more negatively correlated.
Perhaps the most general hypothesis regarding the 
market's reaction to spinoffs is proposed by Hite and Owers 
(1983), who suggest that the gains realized by dividing the 
firm are explained by the savings from using separate 
specialized contracts in which the parent and subsidiary 
have comparative advantages. Hite and Owers posit that 
spinoffs are associated with changes in the firm's 
opportunity set. In this scenario, the demerger better 
positions the corporate entity (as a whole) to exploit the 
new state of the world. However, since the revelation of 
the change in the firm's opportunity set coincides with the 
spinoff announcement, it is difficult (if not impossible) 
to separate the individual effects of the two factors.
Miller (1977) has advanced a clientele argument to 
explain the apparent shareholder wealth gains associated 
with spinoff announcements. That is, the total value of 
the parts can be greater than that of the whole if 
investors hold divergent opinions with regard to the 
prospects of each division. In this situation, each of the 
spun off segments of the firm may be marketed to the group
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of investors with the most optimistic expectations of that 
segment's future performance. Schnabel (1992) duplicates 
Miller's rather ad hoc argument in a more rigorous 
framework, also demonstrating that binding short sales 
constraints are a sufficient (and necessary) condition to 
induce value subadditivity (the whole being worth less than 
the sum of the parts).
2.4. Market Reaction to Spinoff Announcements
Kudla and Mclnish (1983) report a positive stock price 
reaction to spinoff announcements; however, data 
limitations flaw this study. (The sample size is six firms, 
and the day that the new shares are distributed is used as 
the event day.) A more thorough investigation of the 
market reaction to spinoff announcements is conducted by 
Hite and Owers (1983), who examine 123 voluntary spinoffs 
that occurred during 1962-1981. The authors, using the 
event study method and daily data, analyze security price 
reactions around the spinoff announcements in order to 
determine the magnitude and possible sources of valuation 
changes.
Hite and Owers (1983) compute market-adjusted excess 
returns from 50 days before the announcement date through 
the reporting of the completion of the spinoff plan. The 
authors find a statistically significant price increase, on 
average, over the 50 day period prior to the announcement
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date and over the two day "announcement window" (days -1 to
0) of 3.30%.
Another empirical study examining the spinoff 
phenomenon is that of Schipper and Smith (1983). In spite 
of some similarities, there do exist significant 
differences in the findings of these two studies. Also 
using the event study method, Schipper and Smith (1983) 
investigate the cumulative prediction errors from the 
market model for 93 firms that voluntarily spun off a 
subsidiary between the years 1962 and 1982. In contrast to 
the results obtained by Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and 
Smith (1983) find no statistically significant trend over 
the pre-event period. This absence of an upward price 
drift in the months prior to the spinoff announcement is at 
variance with the results obtained by most researchers.
The authors report a positive cumulative abnormal return 
(2.84%) over the (-1 to 0) event window.
A fourth empirical examination of the effects of 
voluntary spinoff announcements on shareholder wealth is 
that of Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). Consistent with the 
results obtained by Hite and Owers (1983), Miles and 
Rosenfeld find the pre-announcement returns (day -120 to 
day -11) to be significantly positive. Consistent with the 
results of both of the previous studies, the two day 
announcement period return is also significantly positive 
(3.34%).
As noted by Hite and Owers (1983), the pattern of 
cumulative excess returns observed by the majority of 
researchers represents two phenomena. First, the spinoff 
firms, on average, experience good stock market performance 
for several months immediately prior to the announcement 
day. Second, the announcement, on average, is associated 
with significantly positive stock price reactions. Since 
this evidence appears to be consistent with wealth gains 
for shareholders, the next obvious avenue of inquiry is 
investigation of potential sources of these wealth gains.
2.5. Tests of Hypotheses
As discussed above, one possible explanation for the 
apparent shareholder wealth gains resulting from spinoffs 
suggested in the literature is bondholder expropriation.
In order to test the expropriation hypothesis, Hite and 
Owers examine the senior security returns as well as common 
stock returns around the spinoff announcement. In an 
examination of the prediction errors of samples of straight 
bonds, convertible bonds and preferred stock of the 
demerging firms, the authors find positive, but 
statistically insignificant results. This work directly 
contradicts the expropriation hypothesis, since one would 
expect a negative price reaction for these securities (and 
a positive price reaction of common stocks) if the 
bondholders' wealth was indeed diminished by a spinoff.
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Additionally, if the expropriation hypothesis were 
correct, one would expect to observe the most strongly 
negative price reactions by the bonds of those firms whose 
equity increased the most. In fact, Hite and Owers (1983) 
find that the returns of the non-convertible debt 
instruments (straight debt and preferred stock) had no 
statistically significant correlation with those of the 
equity.
Interestingly, although more than half of the bonds 
showed positive abnormal returns, more than half of the 
preferred stock abnormal returns were negative. Not 
surprisingly, the convertible securities' price reaction to 
the spinoff announcement was the most similar to that of 
the common stock; positive and statistically significant.
Schipper and Smith (1983) point out that the spinoff 
induced wealth transfer described by Galai and Masulis 
requires exclusive distribution of the equity of the new 
firm to the parent firm's shareholders. There is a wealth 
transfer to the extent that the bondholders' collateral has 
been reduced. Schipper and Smith (1983) analyze their data 
and find that firms routinely assign debt to spun off 
subsidiaries (64 of 93 firms). The authors also find that 
the leverage of spun off firms is similar to that of pre­
spinoff firms. Another test of the bondholder 
expropriation hypothesis involves the impact of a spinoff 
on bond prices and ratings. Schipper and Smith find a low
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frequency of declines in bond prices and ratings associated 
with spinoff announcements, additional evidence 
contradicting the expropriation hypothesis.
The evidence regarding spinoffs undertaken to 
facilitate a merger is not as unambiguous as that 
concerning the bondholder expropriation hypothesis. Hite 
and Owers (1983) include 12 firms in their sample that were 
preparing for a merger by spinning off a subsidiary into a 
free-standing unit. When the data were categorized by 
reason given (by management) for the spinoff, this portion 
of the total sample displayed the largest positive 
cumulative prediction errors over the announcement day 
window.
Unfortunately, because the announcement of the spinoff 
often coincides with that of the merger, it is not possible 
to disentangle the separate effects of each. Since merger 
announcements are known to induce positive stock price 
reactions for the target firm, it is not clear how much of 
the price increase is due to the impending merger, and how 
much (if any) is due to the spinoff itself.
The specialization hypothesis is also tested by Hite 
and Owers (1983). Recall that this explanation involves 
the spinoff of a subsidiary in a fundamentally different 
line of business from that of the parent, which may allow 
each to focus on "the business at hand." Again, the 
authors disaggregate their sample, categorizing by
27
management’s stated motivation for the spinoff, and find 27 
firms that appear to fall into the specialization category. 
The cumulative abnormal prediction errors for this group 
are positive, and are the largest of any group in the 
sample over the entire event period.
A perhaps more painstaking examination of the 
specialization hypothesis is conducted by Schipper and 
Smith (1983). These authors provide two measures of the 
similarity/dissimilarity of the parent and subsidiary 
f irms:
1) industry membership of the parent and subsidiary
2) a comparison of the time series behavior of stock 
returns to the value weighted portfolio of parent 
and subsidiary versus returns of the parent stock 
alone.
Of Schipper and Smith's total sample of 93 firms, 72 spun 
off firms were classified in industries different from that 
of their parents, and 21 were in the same industry. The 
authors also report that nine of the latter 21 may have 
experienced relaxed regulatory or legal constraints.
The second measure of similarity is the extent to 
which the parameter estimates of the market model differ 
for the pre-spinoff combined firm, and the parent firm 
post-spinoff. The authors report that sufficient data were 
available for 62 of the total sample of 93. The hypothesis 
that stock returns follow the same relationship with market 
returns after the ex-date as prior to it is rejected at the
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.05 level for 22 firms. The structural shifts that appear 
to have occurred for the 22 firms are primarily increases 
in idiosyncratic risk and total return variance.
Naturally, this means that for 40 of the firms tested for a 
change in the parameter estimates of the market model, the 
null hypothesis of no change could not be rejected. The 
industry information lends a measure of empirical support 
to the specialization hypothesis. However, the fact that 
variance increased for roughly one-third of the sample 
after the spinoff does not seem to be particularly 
informative vis-a'-vis this hypothesis.
Hite and Owers (1983) classify 19 firms as citing 
legal or regulatory difficulties as motivation for the 
spinoff. Consistent with their hypothesis regarding this 
group, the cumulative excess returns for these firms are 
negative over the entire event period. The 
legal/regulatory group is the only such category to display 
negative excess returns. However, the announcement day 
returns are positive and statistically significant.
Schipper and Smith (1983) classify 18 firms of their total 
sample of 93 as citing relaxation of legal or regulatory 
restrictions as motivation for the spinoff. Consistent 
with the results obtained by Hite and Owers, this group of 
firms is associated with negative cumulative prediction 
errors during the entire event period, and positive returns 
on the announcement day.
Kudla and Mclnish (1988) test Miller's (1977) 
clientele hypothesis, using relative trading volume before 
and after the spinoff as a proxy for the level of 
divergence of opinion regarding the prospects of the spun 
off segments. The authors show that the magnitude of the 
share price reaction to the announcement of a spinoff is 
positively correlated with the increase in trading volume 
post-spinoff. The weak link in this line of research, of 
course, is the somewhat curious assumption that a relative 
increase in trading volume post-spinoff is indicative of 
more greatly diverging opinions. It seems likely that 
trading volume would increase after any important corporate 
event; an investigation of the post-announcement trading 
volume for a group of merging firms (for example) would 
have been informative in this regard.
An interesting empirical result obtained consistently 
in the literature is the positive correlation between the 
increase in share price upon announcement of the spinoff 
and the relative size of the subsidiary being spun off. 
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) divide their sample of 55 firms 
into two subsamples based on the size of the spun off unit 
relative to the parent firm. The "large" spinoff group 
consists of those firms that divested a subsidiary with an 
equity market value of at least 10% of the parent's common 
stock (34 firms), while the small group comprises firms
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whose subsidiary had a market value of less than 10% of the 
parent (21 firms).
The authors find that the effect of minor spinoffs on 
shareholder wealth are small relative to that of major 
spinoffs. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) report a 20.70% 
differential between the two subsamples over the 181-day 
event period, which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The authors conclude that, for the small spinoff 
set, the net present value of the divested unit's cash 
flows is trivial relative to the cash flows of the 
remaining firm, and therefore has no noticeable influence 
on share price.
Hite and Owers (1983) also categorize their sample 
according to the size of the division divested. However, 
the fraction of the equity spun off used to partition the 
sample is 6.6%. Consistent with Miles and Rosenfeld's 
results, Hite and Owers find that over the entire event 
period, the large spinoffs generate excess returns of 11.6% 
and the small spinoffs create excess returns of only 2.7%. 
Although the authors call this result "intuitively 
appealing", no hypotheses are submitted regarding the 
nature of the observed relationship.
Most extant empirical work examining the spinoff 
phenomenon has focused on the announcement effects of 
demergers. Relatively little research has addressed the 
issue of post-spinoff performance. This apparent oversight
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is likely due to data limitations and resulting technical 
difficulties. Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1991) (CMW) 
examine the post-spinoff performance of 146 firms, and find 
that, on average, the spun off segment of these firms 
significantly outperforms the market, as well as a sample 
of matched firms.
CMW investigate the performance of a sample of 146 
subsidiaries that were spun-off voluntarily during the 
1965-1988 period. Using both portfolio-rebalancing and 
buy-and-hold strategies, the authors find that a portfolio 
of spun off firms significantly outperforms both the market 
and a sample of size and industry matched firms over a 
three year period. The authors compare the post­
announcement day performance of spinoffs and IPOs, since 
each is a "new” company to the public markets.
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991) have 
shown that after superior first day returns, IPOs earn 
negative abnormal returns for varying holding periods up to 
three years. In contrast to the early positive returns and 
negative long-term performance of IPOs, CMW find that 
spinoffs under-perform the market in the distribution 
month, and subsequently earn above-market returns for 
varying holding periods within a three year time horizon. 
The authors report that the strongest performance for their 
sample of firms occurs in the second year (between months 
12 and 24 relative to the distribution date).
Over a 36 month period, an investment in CMW's sample 
of spun off firms would earn a cumulative raw return of 
73.8 percent (total return: 106.6 percent assuming monthly 
compounding and dividend reinvestment). After adjusting 
for market returns and the returns of the matched sample 
firms, abnormal returns for the spinoff sample are in 
excess of 20 percent over the three-year period. These 
results are robust with respect to portfolio strategy: 
buy-and-hold and portfolio rebalancing produce comparable 
results.
CMW speculate that these post-spinoff returns can be 
attributed to:
1) enhanced operating performance as a result of a 
reduction in agency and overhead costs,
2) market as opposed to administrative capital 
allocation,
3) incentives created by more effective compensation 
of management, and
4) the potential for asset reallocation to more highly 
valued uses through acquisition.
However, they offer no empirical evidence to support these 
conjectures. The possibility of superior performance by 
spinoffs raises an interesting question in regard to 
capital market efficiency, especially when paired with the 
sub-par performance of IPO's. That is, why do investors 
systematically overbid for the shares of IPO's on the offer 
day, and consistently underbid for the shares of spun off 
subsidiaries when these shares begin trading?
In the case of IPO's, an underwriter underpricing 
argument may explain the issue-day returns, but what of the 
long-term performance of these shares? More pertinent for 
the purposes of this study is the question: why do returns
on shares of spun off firms follow the pattern observed by 
CMW? The authors hypothesize that the sub-par performance 
of spinoffs in the month of distribution can be attributed 
to selling pressure induced by large institutional holders, 
who, because of legal or self-imposed restrictions, may not 
invest in small firms or firms without a "track record". 
After a period of months, the potential number of buyers 
for spun off firm's shares increases as the company 
establishes a dividend record, earnings history, etc. and 
increases the market value of its equity. This type of 
supply/demand argument is at odds with capital market 
theory, however.
CHAPTER 3: THE PRNI HYPOTHESIS
Analysis of the stock price reaction to the 
announcement of a corporate spinoff has been conclusive: 
without exception, researchers report a positive and 
statistically significant average price reaction over the 
announcement window. Tests of the various hypotheses 
seeking to explain this market reaction have been less 
definitive. To date, analysis of the demerger hypotheses 
has consisted primarily of disaggregation of the data by 
various criteria and the subsequent application of the 
event study method to each categorization. The stock price 
reaction for each category is then compared to that of the 
aggregate sample and to each of an alternative grouping.
This approach has provided evidence with respect to 
some of the explanations for the observed stock price 
reaction advanced in the literature. Unfortunately, in 
most cases, it has not been applied as a test of a 
refutable hypothesis. (A notable exception is the tests of 
the bondholder expropriation hypothesis. This hypothesis 
has been rejected both by Hite and Owers, (1983) and 
Schipper and Smith, (1983).) Consequently, there exists no 
satisfactory explanation for the market reaction to the 
announcement of a spinoff. In the following section a new 
hypothesis is offered regarding the positive market 
reaction associated with spinoffs. This hypothesis is 
subsequently tested in the framework of a rigorous model.
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3.1. Rational Expectations and the Stock Market
A spinoff divides a company into two entities, 
typically separating two business units of a corporation 
into stand-alone firms. The operations and management of 
each business unit generally remain unchanged after the 
divestiture. Separation of the operating units of the 
parent and subsidiary seems to be the only real change 
effected by a demerger. Absent resolution of dyssynergies 
between the two operating units, why should this 
restructuring of a corporation's equity create economic 
value? It is possible that a spinoff is a value-neutral 
event, and that the observed stock price response is a 
reflection of market sentiment at the time of the 
announcement.
The finance literature is replete with contradictions 
of the rational expectations hypothesis: that investors'
subjective probability distributions regarding stock 
returns are equivalent to the realized distribution. 
Specifically, it does not appear that the behavior of 
market participants is motivated by strict application of 
Bayes' Rule, which should dictate investors' reaction to 
new information in an informationally efficient market. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that investors display a 
consistent tendency to overreact to new information, 
placing an inordinate emphasis on the most recent data for 
decision making purposes.
Rather than evaluate each incoming piece of 
information as a small part of a much greater whole, it 
appears that investors become euphoric or despondent over a 
firm's (or the market's) prospects when unusually good or 
bad news is disclosed. For example, in two related papers, 
Debondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) examine the performance of 
portfolios comprised of "winners" and "losers" - stocks 
with either extreme capital gains or extreme losses 
(respectively) over periods up to five years. Debondt and 
Thaler report a statistically significant difference in the 
market-adjusted performance (calculated as an equally 
weighted arithmetic average rate of return) of the two 
portfolios for a 36 month period after portfolio formation. 
These results have been replicated by other researchers. 
(For example, see Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter, (1992).)
The work of Robert Shiller (1989) examining stock 
market volatility has led researchers to question the 
rationality of market reaction to now information, given 
the relative stability of dividends over time. The results 
of this research that suggest that the market 
disproportionately weights the most recent information is 
perhaps the strongest evidence available that the financial 
markets may not operate in a strictly rational fashion at 
all times. Other examples of the results of empirical 
research refusing to conform to (existing) theory are the
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familiar and numerous stock market anomalies, such as the 
small firm effect, the January effect, the P/E effect, etc.
Most financial economists accept the presence of 
irrational economic agents in financial markets, but 
disagree with the view that these individuals can influence 
market prices. The standard rebuttal to any irrationality 
hypothesis is a survivorship argument wherein rational 
agents, by virtue of appropriate behavior, accumulate all 
wealth and eliminate irrational agents (and their effect on 
prices) from the market. However, as pointed out by Arrow 
(1982), there exist at least two problems with the 
survivorship argument.
First, in financial markets, not all arbitrage 
possibilities are exploitable. Second, if most agents are 
irrational, it is not at all clear that rational agents can 
profit through arbitrage, at least in the short run. For 
patient arbitrageurs, discounting and the loss of liquidity 
while holding arbitrage positions may serve to reduce any 
profit associated with driving market prices to their 
"correct" values. Additionally, market frictions such as 
transactions costs and the lack of availability of the full 
proceeds of a short sale can reduce the attractiveness of 
an arbitrage position. Finally, although market 
professionals are usually included in any list of rational 
investors who might be expected to recognize and exploit 
available arbitrage opportunities, it appears that even
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those who derive their livelihood from the stock market are 
subject to biases in judgement (DeBondt and Thaler,
(1990)) .
3.2. Investor Psychology
Tverksy and Kahneman (1981) define a decision frame as 
"the decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice". These 
authors have demonstrated in series of experiments that the 
evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produces 
predictable shifts in preference when the same problem is 
"framed" in different ways. That is, the way a problem is 
formulated can affect the choice preferred by decision­
makers. Tversky and Khahneman are able to effect reversals 
of preference by experimental subjects in choices regarding 
monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real. Their 
experiments show that perspective is important in the 
decision-making process.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) also argue that people 
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles to 
simplify the task of assessing probabilities. One of these 
principles, availability, is the ease with which similar 
situations can be brought to mind. The authors suggest 
that recent occurrences are likely to be relatively more 
available (for recall) than earlier occurrences. However, 
since availability is affected by factors other than
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frequency and probability, the reliance on availability 
leads to predictable biases in the subjective assessment of 
probabilities. Specifically, occurrences that are more 
available for recall tend to be judged more "likely" than 
those that are less available. The authors note that "it 
is a common experience that the subjective probability of 
traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car 
overturned by the side of the road."
3.3. The PRNI Hypothesis: Implications and Predictions
3.3.1. Short-Term Effects
Drawing on the work of Tversky and Kahneman, it is 
possible to formulate a new hypothesis regarding the market 
reaction to contractual reorganization. The stock price 
reaction to the announcement of a spinoff may be the result 
of investor optimism, induced (framed, to use Tversky and 
Kahneman's terminology) by a prior period of market gains, 
and may have little to do with the underlying economic 
effects of the demerger. This hypothesis - the positive 
reaction to non-negative information hypothesis - could 
also explain the stock price reaction to mergers, which, 
like spinoffs, may be only a non-negative event inflated by 
investors1 expectations.
In a similar vein, a recent paper by Lee, Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991) demonstrates that the magnitude of the 
discount on closed end mutual funds may be associated with
investor sentiment (whether investors are optimistic or 
pessimistic). Since the PRNI hypothesis implies that 
investors' expectations are influenced by events of the 
recent past, the rate of return of the market immediately 
prior to the spinoff announcement may affect the associated 
stock price reaction. Specifically, if this hypothesis is 
correct, one would expect to observe larger share price 
reactions to spinoff announcements during periods of higher 
market returns. (Hereafter, for ease of exposition, market 
returns will be categorized into "bull" and "bear" 
periods.)
Note that the PRNI hypothesis does not necessarily 
imply that spinoffs are a value-decreasing event. It is 
possible that the typical demerger enhances stockholder 
wealth. A positive stock price reaction may be an 
appropriate response to the announcement of a spinoff, on 
average. However, if the stock price reaction to any given 
announcement is entirely driven by the economic effects of 
the spinoff, then there should be no association between 
the market response to the announcement and the market 
return in prior periods.
It may be that the reaction to events that are 
difficult for investors to evaluate (e.g. economic 
restructurings) are influenced by investor sentiment. An 
empirical investigation of the PRNI hypothesis is conducted 
employing prior period market returns as a proxy for the
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level of investor optimism about future prospects. If 
investor sentiment does in fact influence the market's 
reaction to the announcement of a spinoff, the results of 
this research should be robust with respect to choice of 
proxy for market sentiment. (Assuming, of course, that all 
proxies chosen are indeed representative of investors' 
beliefs about the prospects of the stock market.)
Therefore, the PRNI hypothesis is tested using several 
sentiment indices.
3.3.2. Long-Term Effects
The intended effect of a corporate spinoff (to judge 
from the explanations offered by management(s) at the time 
of the announcement) is to enhance shareholder wealth by 
legally and operationally separating two entities that are 
more valuable apart than together. If improvements in 
operating performance or other benefits from spinoffs are 
realized, on average, the long-term return performance of a 
firm undertaking a spinoff may be improved. More 
generally, the return performance of a portfolio of firms 
measured post-spinoff may exceed that of a portfolio of 
those same firms measured pre-spinoff.
On the other hand, the PRNI hypothesis implies that 
the post-spinoff return performance of a portfolio of 
spinoff firms will not exceed, and indeed, may be less 
than, the return performance of a portfolio of those same
firms pre-spinoff. If the stock price reaction to the 
announcement of a spinoff is primarily a reflection of 
investor sentiment at the time of the announcement, then a 
spinoff should have no positive effect on long-term return 
performance. Note that it is also possible that a 
restructuring in the form of a spinoff does have a positive 
effect on return performance on average, but that this 
effect is recognized and impounded in price on the 
announcement day(s). In order examine the long-term 
effects of a corporate spinoff, pre and post-spinoff 
portfolios of demerging firms are created and analyzed. 
Data, method and results of a study examining the short­
term effects of spinoffs are described in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4: SHORT TERM EFFECTS AND TESTS
4.1. Data and Method
4.1.1. Data
To create the sample of voluntary spinoffs, stock 
distributions coded as tax-free spinoffs are identified 
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
Master daily file. A search of the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval database text is undertaken to identify 
additional spinoff announcements. Next, a search of ^he 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) Index and Moody's Dividend Record 
is conducted to confirm the nature of the stock 
distribution and identify the announcement date. Finally, 
the WSJ article announcing the impending spinoff is 
examined for evidence of contaminating announcements. 
Spinoffs that are considered to be involuntary or taxable 
distributions are eliminated from the data.
The initial search results in a sample of 156 
voluntary spinoffs, occurring between January 1970 and 
December 1990. Of the total sample of 156 announcements of 
voluntary spinoffs, 24 are considered to be contaminated 
because of non-spinoff related information in the 
announcing WSJ article. Thus, the final sample consists of 
132 "clean" voluntary spinoff announcements. Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 provide the frequency of distribution of voluntary 
spinoff announcements by year and month, respectively.
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TABLE 4.1
DISTRIBUTION OF SPINOFF ANNOUNCEMENTS BY YEAR
Number of Spinoff
Year Announcements
1972 2
1974 4
1975 2
1976 4
1977 4
1978 6
1979 6
1980 10
1981 8
Number of Spinoff
Year Announcements
1982 8
1983 10
1984 13
1985 14
1986 19
1987 9
1988 20
1989 6
1990 11
Total 156
TABLE 4.2
DISTRIBUTION OF SPINOFF ANNOUNCEMENTS BY MONTH
Number of Spinoff Number of Spinoff
Month Announcements Month Announcements
Jan 17 Jul 17
Feb 10 Aug 9
Mar 8 Sep 9
Apr 9 Oct 16
May 15 Nov 10
Jun 19 Dec 17
Total 156
The number of spinoffs announced during the decade of the 
1980's (117) appears to have increased dramatically over 
the number announced during the 1970's (28). The increase 
in the number of spinoffs from the 1970's to the 1980's is 
consistent with results reported in prior research.
However, the magnitude of the difference between decades in 
this sample may be amplified by data source limitations.1
No clear trend is apparent in the distribution of 
spinoff announcements by month. However, it does appear 
that the greatest number of spinoffs are announced during 
the beginning, end and middle of the calendar year. This 
probably reflects the popularity of the calendar year as 
fiscal year and the tendency of board of directors' 
meetings, shareholders9 meetings and other corporate 
business to follow a calendar year schedule.2
Summary statistics for the size (of capitalization) of 
the parent and subsidiary firms, as well as relative size 
are presented in Table 4.3. Size is calculated by 
multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the market 
price, both of which are obtained from the CRSP daily file. 
For parent firms, the market price and number of shares 
outstanding used in the computation are those prevailing on
JData from the Dow Jones Newswire is available only 
from June 1979 forward. Therefore, the disproportionate 
number of spinoffs announced during the last 12 years of 
the sample period may be partially attributable to 
selection bias.
2The relatively high number of spinoffs during the
month of January (17) suggests that there may be a "January
effect" for the share price reaction to the announcement of
a spinoff; that is, it is possible that demergers announced
during particular months exhibit systematically larger
share price reactions than those announced in other months.
However, disaggregation of the data by month of
announcement reveal no statistically significant 
differences between demerger announcements in different 
months.
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the day the spinoff is announced. For subsidiary firms, 
the data are gathered on the first day trading data are 
available. Relative size is the ratio of the market value 
of equity of the subsidiary over the market value of the 
equity of the parent.
TABLE 4.3
SUMMARY SIZE STATISTICS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE 
(Parent and Subs in 000*s, Relative Statistics in %)
____________ N MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Parent 156 $988,855 258,296 1,252 14,691,094
Subsidiary 144 197,741 53,886 530 2,767,856
Relative 144 25.16 16.39 1.76 96.68
Size
As might be anticipated, firms that spin off a 
business segment tend to be large, on average (mean market 
value = $989 million). The portion of the equity spun off 
during the restructuring averages 25% for this sample. In 
some cases, the parent is smaller than the subsidiary after 
the spinoff. This peculiar outcome results when the 
smaller segment retains the original name and corporate 
charter. As reported by Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles 
and Rosenfeld (1983), the size of the subsidiary relative 
to the parent appears to be positively correlated with the 
magnitude of the market reaction to the announcement of a 
spinoff. For this sample, the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient between the two variables is .175 
with a p-value of .0624.
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4.1.2. Method
To test the PRNI hypothesis, it is necessary to 
establish a working definition of bull and bear markets.
One simple delineation, suggested by Fabozzi and Francis 
(1977), is to categorize all months with a positive return 
for the value-weighted CRSP index as bull markets and all 
those with a negative return as bear markets. Following 
Fabozzi and Francis, this categorization will be designated 
Up/Down Markets.
Since it is likely that some spinoff announcements 
occur at the beginning of the month, before any period of 
market gains, the Up/Down Markets definition is modified to 
include multiple month periods of gains and losses, 
respectively. Two and three month periods are examined, 
with spinoffs announced during the preceding month(s) of 
each period deemed to have been announced in a "normal" 
period.3
Another definition of bull/bear markets proposed by 
Fabozzi and Francis is Substantial Up and Down (SUD)
Months. The SUD Months definition separates the sample 
period into three subsets: months when the market moves up
substantially, months when the market moves down
Requiring returns to be of a consistent sign for 
longer than three months reduced the sample size and the 
number of degrees of freedom dramatically. Therefore only 
bull/bear periods of a maximum of three months were 
examined for the Up/Down markets scenario.
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substantially, and months when the market does not move 
substantially. The definition of a month in which 
"substantial" move takes place is one for which the 
absolute value of the market return is larger than half of 
one standard deviation of the market return measured over 
the entire sample period (IR^I > 0.5am) . Naturally, bull 
(bear) months are those for which the foregoing inequality 
is true, and the sign of the market return is positive 
(negative). Months during which no substantial move takes 
place are categorized as normal months. Requiring 
persistence over periods longer than two months results in 
the loss of most of the sample observations. Again, 
announcements occurring during the first month of the two 
month analysis fall into the normal categorization.
Finally, a third method of defining bull/bear markets 
is to chose a longer time frame than those described above, 
and require that the sign of the monthly market return be 
primarily, but not exclusively positive or negative. The 
252 month period from 1970-1990 is divided into six month 
segments. Bull (bear) markets are defined as six month 
intervals during which at least four months exhibit a 
positive (negative) market return. Again, normal months 
are those that do not fall into either the bull or bear 
category. This definition is referred to hereafter as Six 
Month Periods. Table 4.4 presents the number of bull, bear
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and normal months for the each of the market definitions of 
investor sentiment.
TABLE 4.4
NUMBER OF MONTHS FOR MARKET INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Persistence
1 month
2 months
3 months
Up /Down Markets 
Bull Bear Normal 
142 110 0
90 50 112
51 25 176
Total
252
252
252
Persistence
1 month
2 months
Substantial Up and Down Months
Bull Bear Normal Total
114 75 63 252
86 39 127 252
Persistence 
4 of 6 months 
with same sign
Six Month Periods 
Bull Bear Normal
78 30 144
Total
252
Given the decision-making heuristics and biases that the 
PRNI hypothesis is predicated upon, it seems that the 
recent past performance of the stock market itself may be 
the best proxy for investor expectations about future 
market performance. However, an investigation of the 
robustness of the PRNI hypothesis to varying specifications 
of investor "optimism" and "pessimism" may be illuminating 
with respect to the generality of the hypothesis. In this 
spirit, the hypothesis is examined in the context of four 
additional proxies for investor sentiment. The four 
proposed measures of investor sentiment are:
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1) the University of Michigan's Institute for Social 
Research's consumer confidence survey,
2) the ABC News/Money magazine consumer comfort index,
3) the monthly percentage change in the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis's Index of Leading Indicators,
4) the percentage of investment advisory services that are 
"bullish".
Descriptions of these four data series follow.
The first non-market investor sentiment proxies to be 
described are the two indices of consumer confidence: the
University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research's 
consumer confidence survey (CCS) and the ABC News/Money 
magazine consumer comfort index (CCI). Although the 
indices each attempt to measure and quantify the 
expectations of consumers and thus predict their future 
behavior, survey frequency as well as the number of 
questions asked differ between the two polls.
The CCS is a monthly telephone survey of US consumers 
chosen at random. The survey consists of five questions: 
two regarding the individual's personal finances (short­
term and long-term), two concerning the economic outlook 
for the nation (short-term and long-term), and one 
pertaining to the likelihood of a purchase of consumer 
durables within the year. The CCI is also a telephone 
survey of randomly chosen individuals, but is conducted on 
a weekly, rather than a monthly basis. The CCI consists of 
only three questions regarding the same three areas of
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concern: personal finances, outlook for the aggregate
economy, and near-term purchasing conditions.
Each organization analyzes the information gathered in 
its survey and condenses the data into a single number.
This number is intended to characterize the relevant time 
period with respect to the confidence of consumers. 
Relatively higher numbers indicate that consumers plan to 
increase purchases over the near term, and relatively lower 
numbers indicate the converse. The time series of this 
data may be evaluated to detect trends in consumer 
confidence, and to gauge whether consumers plan to make 
more or fewer purchases during the upcoming months than 
those immediately past.
The University of Michigan's index has been compiled 
on a quarterly basis since 1945, but on a monthly basis 
only since January, 1978. Therefore, monthly figures from 
this index are available for only the last 156 of the 252 
month sample period. To include the entire sample period 
in the analysis, quarterly data are converted to monthly 
data by using each quarterly figure as the index value for 
each of the three months comprising the quarter. The ABC 
News/Money magazine index is a weekly number that is a 
monthly moving average, so that the figure reported for the 
last week of the month is the average for the month. This 
monthly average is the figure used to represent investor 
sentiment. The CCI has been compiled since the end of
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1985; therefore only 61 months of the total sample period 
are available for analysis.
To test the PRNI hypothesis, it is important to 
segregate the data into bull months, bear months, and 
normal months. Since the data are reported as (or can be 
translated into) individual monthly numbers, an obvious 
method for grouping months into the three aforementioned 
categories is to partition the data by guartile. That is, 
months for which the value of the index appears in the top 
guartile of all index values observed during the sample 
period are deemed to be bull months. Similarly, months for 
which the value of the index appears in the bottom quartile 
of all index values observed during the sample period are 
called bear months. All remaining months (those that fall 
into the two middle quartiles) are normal months. As 
before, the PRNI hypothesis may then be tested by comparing 
the average prediction errors from the market model on the 
day(s) on which a spinoff is announced across the three 
(bull, bear, and normal) categories.
Another potential proxy for investor sentiment is the 
level of aggregate economic activity. That is, it may be 
that investors gauge the prospects of the stock market by 
evaluating certain macroeconomic variables. Since it is 
likely that investor's beliefs about the prospects of the 
stock market are influenced by the level of future economic 
activity (as opposed to current economic activity), the
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index of leading indicators seems a reasonable candidate 
for a measure of investor sentiment. The eleven-component 
index of leading indicators is one of three business cycle 
indices (leading, lagging and coincident indicators) 
compiled and published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
in the monthly Survey of Current Business.
Naturally, the components of the index of leading 
indicators are economic variables presumed to be positively 
correlated with future aggregate economic activity.
Examples of these components include consumer goods 
manufacturers' new orders for materials, the number of new 
building permits issued for residential housing, and the 
money supply (M2). Importantly for this analysis, the 
index of leading indicators also includes the return on the 
S&P 500 stock index, and the monthly results of the 
University of Michigan's consumer confidence survey.4 
Implications of this overlap in proxies for investor 
sentiment are discussed later.
The index of leading indicators is reported as a 
monthly figure that is a weighted average of the eleven 
component indices. Since changes in the index over time 
(rather than its absolute value) may be likely to influence 
investor confidence, the percentage change in the index 
from one month to the next is used as the proxy for
4The consumer confidence survey information became a 
component of the index of leading indicators in January, 
1989.
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investor sentiment. That is, months during which a 
relatively large increase in the index of leading 
indicators is observed are deemed to be bull months. 
Similarly, months during which a relatively large decrease 
in the index of leading indicators is observed are deemed 
to be bear months. Months for which there is relatively 
little change in the index of leading indicators from the 
previous month are normal months. Procedurally, this 
segregation is again effected by partitioning the data into 
quartiles, with the upper quartile labeled bull, the lower 
quartile labeled bear, and the two middle quartiles normal.
The fourth non-market proxy for investor sentiment 
proposed is the number of professional advisory services 
that are optimistic or bullish with regard to the prospects 
of the stock market. This proxy is reported as a 
percentage of the total number of advisory services 
surveyed on a monthly basis. That is, the number reported 
for each month is the percentage of advisory services of 
those surveyed that are predicting an upturn in the stock 
market. The data is compiled by Investor's Intelligence of 
Larchmont, NY. Collection of this data began in January 
1974, so there exists information for 205 months of the 252 
month sample period.
Again, months are separated into bull, bear, and 
normal categories so as to examine the share price reaction 
to the announcement of a spinoff in different types of
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markets. The categorization into bull, bear and normal 
months is effected by the segregation of the data into 
quartiles as described above. Naturally, months with the 
greatest percentage of investor advisory service described 
as bullish are bull months. Months with the smallest 
percentage of investment advisory services bullish are bear 
months, and all other months are considered normal. Table 
4.5, Panels A and B present summary statistics and number 
of bull, bear, and normal months for each of the non-market 
investor sentiment proxies, respectively.
The data are categorized using the above definitions 
of bull/bear markets, and the event study method (Patel1, 
(1976)) applied to each subset. The event study method 
used is as follows. The market model is 
estimated over days -240 to -121 relative to the 
announcement day:
Rjt — 3; + /JjRn,, + eit, t —240, ... ,—121
where
Rjt = return on equity of firm i on day t,
Rtttt = CRSP value-weighted index of returns on the NYSE
and AMEX exchanges on day t,
a;,/?; = market model intercept and slope parameters 
estimated by OLS regression,
eit = residual return to stock i on day t.
The market model is used to compute prediction errors for
the period beginning 90 days before the event day and
ending 15 days after.
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TABLE 4.5
Panel A SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR NON-MARKET 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
University of Michigan Index (CCS)
N Mean Min Max
Upper
Ouartile
Lower
Ouartile
Monthly
Quarterly
156
252
83.1
81.6
51.7 101.0 
54.4 99.5
93.9
91.8
71.7
72.5
ABC News/Monev Index (CCI)
N Mean Min Max
Upper
Ouartile
Lower
Ouartile
Monthly 61 -11.8 -■43.0 7.0 -7.0 -14.0
Percent Change in Index of Leading Indicators
N Mean Min Max
Upper
Ouartile
Lower
Ouartile
Monthly 252 3.9 32.0 42.8 10.6 -2.5
Percentage of Investment Services Bullish
N Mean Min Max
Upper
Ouartile
Lower
Ouartile
Monthly 204 43.0 16.0 80.0 50.0 35.0
Panel B NUMBER OF MONTHS FOR NON-MARKET 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
University of Michigan Index
Monthly Data 
Quarterly Data
Bull Bear 
39 38 
64 61
Normal
79
127
Total
156
252
ABC News/Monev Index
Monthly Data
Bull Bear 
18 18
Normal
25
Total
61
Percent Change in Index of Leading Indicators
Bull Bear Normal Total
Monthly Data 63 64 125 252
Percentage of Investment Services Bullish
Bull Bear Normal Total
Monthly Data 46 46 112 204
Prediction errors (u,,) for days -90 through +15 (the 
event period) are computed as follows:
Ujt = rit — (a, + /JjRmt) , t= —90/... /+15.
Average prediction errors and cumulative average prediction 
errors, respectively, are given by:
Nt
PEt= E U it 
i=l
Nt
and
L
CPE, = E PEt L = -90,...,+15
t=-90
where
Nt = the number of firms in the sample.
T statistics are computed as:
ti
t S PEt]
T =  t=tn______________
[ (t, - t0 + 1) (p)]1/2,
where
t0= first day in interval, 
t,= last day in interval,
-121 1 -121
S [PEt - 119 { E PEt }]2
p = t=-240__________ t=-240______
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Consistent with the PRNI hypothesis, if investors' 
decisions are influenced by their optimism or pessimism (as 
measured by the above-described proxies), the stock price 
reaction to a spinoff announced in a bull market should be 
larger than the reaction to a spinoff announced during a 
bear market. Additionally, the stock price reaction to a 
spinoff announced in a bull (bear) market should be larger 
(smaller) than the reaction to a spinoff announced during a 
normal market.
The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows.
H0: the stock price reaction to the announcement of a
spinoff during a bull market is not significantly different 
from the market reaction to the same announcement made 
during a bear or normal market. Hj: the stock price
reaction to the announcement of a spinoff during a bull 
market is significantly different than the market reaction 
to the same announcement made during a bear or normal 
market. Note that for all definitions of bull/bear markets 
a joint hypothesis is tested. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis results if:
1) investor sentiment is unrelated to the stock price 
reaction to a corporate spinoff, or
2) the categorizations into bull/bear markets is an 
inappropriate proxy for investor sentiment.
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The test whether a significant difference exists between 
bull, bear and normal announcements is Student's t-test for 
the difference in means between two independent samples.
The t value for the difference in means test is computed 
as:
t = ----
v(s2t/ni + s22/n2)
where
Xj = mean of group i,
n; = number of observations in group i, 
and
S 2; = S (Xj - x)2
n - 1
The announcement day (day 0) is defined as the first 
mention of an impending spinoff in the WSJ. The event 
window includes day -1, since there is usually a one day 
lag between an announcement and its publication in the WSJ.
4.2. Tests of PRNI Hypothesis Using Market Proxies for 
Investor Sentiment
Table 4.6 presents results for the two day event 
window (-1 to 0) and the 89 day pre-announcement period.
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TABLE 4.6
PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD AND EVENT WINDOW 
AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS (APE)
Event
Period (Davs) 
-1 to 0 
-90 to -2
N
156
156
Full Sample
APE
0.0267
0.0399
T-Stat
13.10**
3.59**
Percent
Positive
67
56
Clean Sample
Event
Period (Davs) 
-1 to 0 
-90 to -2
N
132
132
APE
0.0267
0.0369
T-Stat
12.15**
2.97**
Percent
Positive
68
56
** Significant at the .01 level.
Over the two day event window, the average prediction error 
for the clean sample is 2.67% and is statistically 
significant at the .01 level.5 The clean sample includes 
only observations not contaminated by the contemporaneous 
announcement of non-spinoff related information. During 
the 89 day period prior to the spinoff announcement, the 
sample exhibits a statistically significant upward price 
drift.
5Results over Two Day Event Window (-1 to
# Obs APE
Hite & Owers 123 0.033
Schipper & Smith 93 0.028
Miles & Rosenfeld * 55 0.033
T-Stat 
13.25 
6.61 
6.55
* Miles and Rosenfeld consider day 0 to be the day before
the announcement appears in the WSJ so these results are 
reported for day 0 to +1 in their article.
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4.2.1. Up/Down Markets Definition of Investor Sentiment
When the clean sample is categorized according to 
whether the announcement occurred during a bull, bear or 
normal month using the Up/Down Markets definition, positive 
announcement effects are observed for all categorizations 
over the two day event window (-1 to 0) . These results are 
summarized in Table 4.7.
Note that the APE for announcements made during months 
when the market return is positive is substantially larger 
than the APE associated with months during which the index 
return is negative. For the clean sample, Up market 
prediction errors average between 4.04 and 5.51 percent; 
prediction errors for announcements made during Down 
markets average 0.32 to 1.14 percent.6 These differences 
are statistically significant for all three categorizations 
of the data. Recall that for this definition of bull/bear 
markets, the "normal" designation indicates a month at the 
beginning of a two or three month bull or bear period that 
is discarded in order to more clearly demarcate bull and 
bear markets. For the two and three month categorizations 
(Panels B and C, respectively) the difference between 
announcements occurring in bull and normal months is
6 Similar results were obtained with the market- 
adjusted returns model. The mean-adjusted returns model 
was not used, because Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) argue this 
technique tends to produce upward (downward) biased 
abnormal returns when the event under investigation occurs 
in a bull (bear) market.
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statistically significant; the difference between 
announcements occurring in bear and normal months is not. 
Assuming that investor sentiment is accurately represented 
by the Up/Down Markets separation, the results support the 
PRNI hypothesis.7
4.2.2. SUD Months Definition of Investor Sentiment
The results of the analysis based on the SUD Months 
categorization of the data are reported in Table 4.8. 
Differences between the stock price reactions for the SUD 
disaggregations of the sample are smaller than those for 
the Up/Down market categorization. However, these 
differences (approximately 4.1 percent for one month 
persistence and 2.6 percent for two months) are of 
considerable magnitude, given that the stock price reaction 
to the typical spinoff averages 2.7 percent.
While the one month SUD disaggregation (Panel A) displays a 
statistically significant difference between bull and bear 
months, the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
populations cannot be rejected for the two month definition 
(Panel B).
7It is also possible that spinoffs which most enhance 
shareholder wealth tend to be announced during periods of 
rising market prices. However, results of an investigation 
of the differential long-term shareholder wealth effects of 
spinoffs announced in bull vs bear market do not support 
this supposition.
63
TABLE 4.7
UP/DOWN MARKETS 
Bull = R..J > 0 Bear = Rn, < 0
Panel A 1 Month Persistence
Market N APE
Full Sample 
T-Stat % Pos
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means
Bull
Bear
87
69
156
.0400
.0098
12.52** 69 
5.65** 65
Clean Sample
2.75** (Bull-Bear)
Bull
Bear
71
61
132
.0404
.0105
11.41** 70 
5.55** 66
2.47* (Bull-Bear)
Panel B 2 Months Persistence
Market N APE
Full Sample 
T-Stat % Pos
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means
Bull
Bear
Normal
56
31
69
156
.0474
.0002
.0218
12.28** 66 
1.75f 58 
7.46** 73
Clean Sample
3.02** (Bull-Bear)
1.91f (Bull-Normal) 
-1.56 (Bear-Normal)
Bull
Bear
Normal
46
27
59
132
.0508
.0032
.0185
12.22** 70 
2.05* 59 
5.99** 71
2.73** (Bull-Bear) 
2.20* (Bull-Normal) 
-1.02 (Bear-Normal)
Panel C 3 Months Persistence
Market N APE
Full Sample 
T-Stat % Pos
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means
Bull
Bear
Normal
35
14
107
156
.0579
.0060
.0192
10.56** 69 
1.56 64 
9.21** 67
Clean Sample
2.48* (Bull-Bear) 
2.46* (Bull-Normal) 
-0.79 (Bear-Normal)
Bull 31 
Bear 12 
Normal 89 
132
** Significant 
* Significant 
f Significant
.0551
.0114
.0188
at the 
at the 
at the
9.98** 68 
1.82f 67 
8.23** 69
.01 level 
.05 level 
.10 level
1.97* (Bull-Bear) 
2.11* (Bull-Normal) 
-0.43 (Bear-Normal)
TABLE 4.8
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SUBSTANTIALLY UP AND DOWN MONTHS 
Bull = | Rnj | >0. 5am Bear = | | >0. 5crn
and Rm>0 and Rm<0
Panel A 1 Month Persistence
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal
N
72
42
42
156
APE
.0402
.0024
Full Sample
T-Stat
11.48**
3.09**
% Pos 
68 
57
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means 
2.64** (Bull-Bear) 
0.63 (Bull-Normal)
.0317 7.09** 81 -2.17* (Bear-Normal)
Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal
61
36
35
132
.0413 10.79** 69 2.55* (Bull-Bear)
.0020 2.89** 56 0.72 (Bull-Normal)
.0309 6.52** 88 -2.09* (Bear-Normal)
Panel B 2 Months Persistence
Market N APE
Bull 63 .0392
Bear 16 .0131
Normal 77 .0193
156
Bull 53
Bear 13
Normal 66 
132
Full Sample
T-Stat % Pos 
10.68** 63
2.93** 69
7.54** 72
Clean Sample
.0398 9.89** 64
.0085 1.86f 69
.0197 7.39** 73
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means 
1.08 (Bull-Bear) 
1.55 (Bull-Normal) 
■0.28 (Bear-Normal)
1.20 (Bull-Bear)
1.41 (Bull-Normal) 
■0.47 (Bear-Normal)
** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level,
f Significant at the .10 level.
A bull market is a one or two month period during
which the market return is positive, and the absolute value 
of the market return is greater than one-half the standard 
deviation of the market return over the entire sample 
period.
A bear market is a one or two month period during 
which the market return is negative, and the absolute value 
of the market return is greater than one-half the standard 
deviation of the market return over the entire sample 
period.
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Interestingly, for the one month categorization of the 
data, the difference between bull and normal month APE's is 
statistically insignificant, while the difference between 
bear and normal months APE's is significant at the .05 
level.
4.2.3. Six Month Periods Definition of Investor Sentiment 
Results for the Six Month Periods bull/bear 
categorization are presented in Table 4.9. These results 
are also consistent with the PRNI hypothesis; the 
difference between the APE's of the bull and bear 
subsamples is 4.7 %. The magnitude of this difference is 
second only to that of the two month Up/Down Markets 
categorization and is statistically significant at the .05 
level.8 In summary, results of the analysis of market 
oriented proxies for investor sentiment appear to be 
consistent with the PRNI hypothesis. That is, the stock 
price reaction to announcements made during months when 
investors are optimistic are larger, on average, than those 
made during months when investors are expected to be 
pessimistic.
8The market crash of October 1987 did not have a 
significant effect on these results; only one spinoff 
announcement during this month appears in the sample. 
Removing this observation from the sample has no effect.
TABLE 4.9
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SIX MONTH PERIODS
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal
N
Bull
Bear
Normal
44
18
94
156
39
16
77
132
APE
.0566
.0023
.0176
T-Stat
13.12**
1.58
6.64**
% Pos 
80 
61 
68
0529
0059
0185
Clean Sample
11.95** 79
1.79f 63 
6.58** 71
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means 
2.69** (Bull-Bear)
1.82f (Bull-Normal) 
-0.76 (Bear-Normal)
2.17* (Bull-Bear)
1.67f (Bull-Normal) 
■0.56 (Bear-Normal)
** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level,
f Significant at the .10 level.
This categorization defines a bull market as a six month 
period during which the market return is positive for at 
least four of the six months. A bear market is a six month 
period during which at least four months display negative 
market returns.
4.3. Tests of PRNI Hypothesis Using Non-Market Proxies 
for Investor Sentiment
4.3.1. Consumer Confidence Indices
In order to examine the robustness of the PRNI
hypothesis to different specifications of investor optimism
and pessimism, alternative measures of investor sentiment
are used to categorize the data. Results of the first non-
market proxy categorization (the University of Michigan's
consumer confidence survey) appear in Table 4.10. Recall
that monthly data for the CCS begins in January 1978, so
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spinoff announcements occurring prior to that date are 
excluded from the monthly analysis.
No statistically significant difference exists for the 
three possible pairings of between bull, bear and normal 
markets for any categorization of the data using the CCS as 
a proxy for investor sentiment. Interestingly, for both 
the monthly and quarterly data, bear market APE's are 
larger than those for normal and bull markets.
The second non-market proxy for investor sentiment 
used to test the PRNI hypothesis is the ABC News/Money 
magazine consumer comfort index. Since the CCI began in 
December 1985, only spinoff announcements that occurred 
during the last 61 months of the 252 month sample period 
are included in this analysis. Table 4.11 presents event 
study results obtained from a categorization of the spinoff 
data using the level of the CCI as a proxy for bull, bear 
and normal markets. Again, there exist no statistically 
significant differences between the APE's for bull, bear 
and normal categorizations of the data. For this investor 
sentiment proxy, however, the average prediction errors 
from the subset of firms that announced during normal 
months display the largest average prediction errors.
While the results obtained from the two indices of consumer 
confidence (or comfort) seem to be evidence against the
6 8
TABLE 4.10
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'S 
MONTHLY INDEX OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
Full Sample
Market N APE T-Stat % Pos
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means
Bull
Bear
Normal
48
26
66
.0236
.0354
.0253
9.76** 74 
6.33** 70 
6.14** 64
-0.72
-0.16
0.59
(Bull-Bear) 
(Bull-Normal) 
(Bear-Normal)
140
Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal
44
21
57
.0246
.0417
.0222
9.73** 75 
6.88** 81 
4.30** 61
-1.01
0.20
0.61
(Bull-Bear) 
(Bull-Normal) 
(Bear-Normal)
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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'S 
QUARTERLY INDEX OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
Market N APE
Full Sample 
T-Stat % Pos
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means
Bull
Bear
Normal
65
36
55
.0293
.0333
.0207
11.07** 66 
6.56** 67 
5.36** 67
-0.21
0.60
0.70
(Bull-Bear) 
(Bull-Normal) 
(Bear-Normal)
156
Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal
54
28
50
.0268
.0391
.0195
9.61** 67 
7.02** 75 
4.50** 66
-0.58
0.60
0.03
(Bull-Bear)
(Bull-Normal)
(Bear-Normal)
132
** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level,
t Significant at the .10 level.
Values of the monthly and quarterly indices of consumer 
confidence are subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are 
those for which the value of the index appears in the upper 
quartile of the distribution. Bear months are those for 
which the value of the index appears in the lower quartile 
of the distribution. All other months are considered 
normal.
69
TABLE 4.11
ABC NEWS/MONEY CONSUMER COMFORT INDEX
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal
N
26
17
22
65
APE
.0299
.0149
.0465
Full Sample
T-Stat
9.63**
2.81**
4.09**
% Pos 
73 
59 
67
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means 
0.94 (Bull-Bear) 
-0.74 (Bull-Normal) 
-1.47 (Bear-Normal)
Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal
21
16
17
54
0291 9.09** 71 0.88
0135 2.54** 56 -0.51
0419 2.17** 65 -1.13
(Bull-Bear)
(Bull-Normal)
(Bear-Normal)
** Significant at the .01 level.
Values of the monthly index of consumer comfort are 
subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are those for which 
the value of the index appears in the upper quartile of the 
distribution. Bear months are those for which the value of 
the index appears in the lower quartile of the 
distribution. All other months are considered normal.
PRNI hypothesis at first glance, further consideration of 
the nature of consumer confidence raises questions 
regarding the validity of this measure as a proxy for 
investor sentiment.
Given the complementary nature of the investment and 
consumption decisions, it may be that periods during which 
consumption is preferred are those for which the investment 
climate is perceived to be poor. Conversely, when 
investment prospects are perceived to be good, consumers
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may prefer to defer purchases to future periods in order to 
take advantage of superior (expected) returns. Thus, it 
may be that investor sentiment is inversely related to 
consumer sentiment. If consumer confidence (as a proxy for 
planned purchases over the near term) is relatively high, 
this may simply mean that investment prospects are 
relatively poor.
Note that the above argument implicitly assumes that 
consumer (or investor) income is fixed across periods. If 
income is changing from one period to the next, it is 
possible for consumption and investment to be positively 
correlated. That is, if income is rising (falling), an 
individual may increase (decrease) levels of both 
consumption and investment. Since the CCS and CCI include 
survey information regarding prospective levels of income, 
it is possible that consumer confidence may be an 
appropriate proxy for investor sentiment.
If consumer sentiment is inversely related to 
investment opportunities, one might expect the level of 
consumer sentiment to be negatively correlated with proxies 
or return to capital available. In fact, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient indicates that both the monthly and 
quarterly CCS are negatively correlated with the return on 
the value-weighted CRSP index. Table 4.12 presents a 
correlation matrix for the various proxies for investor 
sentiment. Both indices are also negatively correlated
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with the monthly percent change in the index of leading 
indicators. This evidence suggests that consumer sentiment 
may not be a perfect representation of investor sentiment.
4.3.2. Percent Change in Index of Leading Indicators
It may be that investor sentiment is influenced by 
changes in macroeconomic variables; in the context of the 
PRNI hypothesis, it is possible that large changes in the 
index of leading indicators affect the stock price reaction 
to the announcement of a spinoff. That is, relatively 
large increases (decreases) in the level of macroeconomic 
variables that are believed to lead the overall economy may 
cause investor optimism (pessimism). The separation of the 
spinoff data using the percent change in the index of 
leading indicators criterion is presented in Table 4.13.
For the clean sample, the difference between the 
average prediction errors in bull and bear markets is 2.6 
percent. This difference is statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level. Differences between the APE's for 
both bull and bear vs normal markets are not statistically 
significant. As discussed earlier in this chapter, two of 
the components of the index of leading indicators are the 
return on the S&P 500 and the monthly results of the 
University of Michigan's consumer confidence survey.
TABLE 4.12
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Percent Change Percentage of 
in Index of Investment Monthly
Leading Indicators Services Bullish CCI
Quarterly
CCS
Return on Value .1588
Weighted CRSP Index (.0128)
.1064
(.1299)
-.0013
(.9920)
-.2167
(.0005)
Monthly CCS ** -.1671
(.0417)
.4662
(.0001)
.8756
(.0001)
.9808
(.0001)
Quarterly CCS -.1353
(.0322)
.4085
(.0001)
.8916
(.0001)
Monthly CCI f .1434
(.3250)
.2583
(.0444)
Percentage of 
Investment 
Services Bullish
.0234
(.1092)
* P-Values in parentheses
** University of Michigan’s Consumer Confidence Survey 
t ABC News/Money Consumer Comfort Index
Monthly
CCS
-.1204
(.1294)
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TABLE 4.13
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PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX OF LEADING INDICATORS
Market N APE
Full Sample 
T-Stat % Pos
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means
Bull 47 .0402 7.53** 70 1.45 (Bull-Bear)
Bear 71 .0221 7.68** 64 0.98 (Bull-Normal)
Normal 38 .0134 4.28** 65 0.76 (Bear-Normal)
156
Clean Sample
Bull 39 .0481 8.47** 70 1.94| (Bull-Bear)
Bear 64 .0221 7.68** 64 1.50 (Bull-Normal)
Normal 29 .0101 4.08** 68 0.78 (Bear-Normal)
132
** Significant at the .01 level, 
f Significant at the .10 level.
Monthly percentage change in the index of leading 
indicators is subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are 
those for which the percentage change of the value of the 
index appears in the upper quartile of the distribution. 
Bear months are those for which the percentage change of 
the value of the index appears in the lower quartile of the 
distribution. All other months are deemed normal.
The results presented in Table 4.13 are consistent 
with those obtained by market proxies for investor 
sentiment, but inconsistent with results obtained for 
consumer confidence proxies for investor sentiment. From 
these relationships, one might suspect that changes in the 
index of leading indicators are more strongly correlated 
with the return of the stock market than the results of
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consumer confidence surveys. In fact, the percent change 
in the index of leading indicators is positively and 
significantly correlated with the contemporaneous market 
return; it is also negatively and significantly correlated 
with the quarterly CCS. (See Table 4.12)
The negative correlation between consumer confidence 
and percent change in the index of leading indicators can 
be interpreted as evidence in support of the argument that 
consumer confidence (indices) and the value of investment 
opportunities are inversely related. Unfortunately, since 
the percent change in the index of leading indicators seems 
to closely follow the stock market, it is difficult to 
construe this index as a "different" proxy for investor 
sentiment.
4.3.3. Percentage of Investment Advisory Services Bullish 
Results obtained using the percentage of investment 
advisory services that are bullish as a proxy for investor 
sentiment are presented in Table 4.14.
The categorization of spinoff announcements according 
to type of market prevailing when the announcement takes 
place reveals no statistically significant differences 
between categorizations. Interestingly, the percentage of 
investment services that are bullish is positively and 
significantly correlated with the indices of consumer
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confidence, but not with the contemporaneous market return 
or the percent change in the index of leading indicators. 
Therefore, it is possible that the results reported in 
Table 4.14 would be consistent with those obtained using 
the indices of consumer confidence as proxy for investor 
sentiment. In fact, this is the case.
TABLE 4.14
PERCENTAGE OF INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES BULLISH
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal
N
36
38
80
154
APE
,0302
,0309
,0239
Full Sample
T-Stat % Pos
11.62** 78
6.61** 63
5.66** 65
Clean Sample
T-Statistic for 
Difference in Means 
-0.04 (Bull-Bear) 
0.53 (Bull-Normal) 
0.42 (Bear-Norma1)
Bull 30 .0275 10.40** 77 -0.68
Bear 32 .0403 7.68** 69 0.52
Normal 65 .0207 4.41** 65 1.06
(Bull-Bear)
127
** Significant at the .01 level.
Monthly data for the percentage of investor services that 
are bullish are subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are 
those for which the percentage of services that are bullish 
appears in the upper quartile of the distribution. Bear 
months are those for which the percentage of services that 
are bullish appears in the lower quartile of the 
distribution. All other months are deemed normal.
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4.4. Integrated Tests
It appears that the PRNI hypothesis cannot be rejected 
when a "market" proxy (or one closely correlated with the 
market) is used to represent investor sentiment. Results 
of tests of the PRNI hypothesis using non-market proxies do 
not support the hypothesis. In order to test the 
hypothesis using all previously employed proxies for 
investor sentiment, an ANOVA model is formulated and 
tested. Consider the model
Yijk = U + P, + Mj + P*Mk + eijk
where
Y is the cumulative (over the two day event window) 
prediction error;
U is the main effect;
P is the proxy of investor sentiment i = Up/Down Markets,
i = SUD Months, 
i = Six Month 
Periods 
i = Percent Change 
in Index of 
Leading 
Indicators 
i = CCS, 
i = CCI,
i = Percentage of 
Advisory 
Services 
Bullish;
M is the type of market j = bull,
j = bear, 
j = normal;
P*M is the interaction of proxy and market effects and the 
eijk are random errors with zero mean and equal variances.
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The Up/Down Markets and SUD Months sentiment proxies 
have more than one bull/bear market definition. The 
following definitions are used in this integrated analysis: 
for Up/Down markets, three months of persistence, and SUD 
Months, two months of persistence. For the University of 
Michigan's CCS, quarterly data are used since observations 
are available for the entire sample period (in contrast to 
the monthly data). Again, the PRNI hypothesis is tested.
In the ANOVA framework, the null hypothesis is that M, the 
type of market, has no statistically significant effect on 
the cumulative prediction errors (Yijk) . Naturally, the 
alternative hypothesis is that prediction errors observed 
across the three different types of markets are 
significantly different from one another.
The ANOVA model is fitted to all 841 clean 
observations. Results are presented in Table 4.15.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ALL INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
TABLE 4.15
Source
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sums of 
Squares
Mean
Square F-Value Pr>F
Proxy
Market
6
2
0.000166
0.064284
0.070748
0.135198
4.260561
4.395759
0.01 1.0000 
6.09 0.0024
1.12 0.3425Proxy*Market 12
Model
Error
Total
20
820
840
0.006759 1.28 0.1833
0.005279
R2 = 0.03076
Grand Mean = 0.02701
The choice of proxy for investor sentiment has no effect on 
the size of the market model prediction errors, since the 
same data are evaluated using each market proxy. In 
contrast, the type of market prevailing on the day the 
spinoff is announced has an effect on the cumulative 
prediction error that is statistically significant at the 
.01 level. Consistent with the PRNI hypothesis, the 
average prediction error for announcements occurring during 
a bull market is larger than those associated with 
announcements during normal or bear months (.0397 vs .0206 
and .0224, respectively). Tukey's studentized range test, 
a Bonferroni t test, and Scheffe's test all indicate that 
the difference between the stock price reaction in bull 
months and that in bear and normal months is statistically 
significant at the .10 level. There is no statistically 
significant interaction effect.
The above analysis investigates market and proxy 
effects on the cumulative prediction errors by using all 
proxies for investor sentiment developed in this study. By 
separating the investor sentiment proxies into two groups - 
market and non-market proxies - it is possible to draw a 
clear distinction between the market (bull, bear, normal) 
effects when using market vs non-market proxies. The 
"market" proxies are the Up/Down Markets, SUD Months and 
Six Month period definitions of investor sentiment. The 
percent change in the index of leading indicators is
included in this group, since this proxy seems to be 
correlated with the other three. The group of non-market 
proxies includes the two consumer confidence indices, and 
the percentage of investor advisory services bullish. 
Separate ANOVA models are fitted to the data for each of 
the two groups of market proxies. Results of these 
analyses are in Tables 4.16 and 4.17.
TABLE 4.16
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR MARKET 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Source
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sums of 
Sauares
Mean
Sauare F-Value Pr>F
Proxy 3 
Market 2 
Proxy*Market 6 
Model 11 
Error 516 
Total 527
0.000012
0.108422
0.004867
0.113302
2.655785
2.769086
0.001030
0.005279
0.00
10.27
0.15
1.95
1.0000
0.0024
0.9883
0.0313
R2 = 0.04092
Grand Mean = 0.02689
TABLE 4.17
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NON-MARKET 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Source
Degrees of 
Freedom
Sums of 
Sauares
Mean
Sauare F-Value Pr>F
Proxy 2 
Market 2 
Proxy*Market 4 
Model 8 
Error 304 
Total 312
0.000135
0.006028
0.015714
0.021877
1.604776
1.626653
0.002735
0.005279
0.01
0.57
0.74
0.52
0.9873
0.5656
0.5625
0.8427
R2 = 0.01345
Grand Mean = 0.02721
From the above tables, it is evident that when market 
effects are analyzed according to the type of investor 
sentiment proxy used to segregate the data, only market 
proxies are associated with statistically significant 
differences in stock price reaction across types of 
markets. For the non-market proxies, market effects (along 
with proxy and interaction effects) are not statistically 
significant. For the models in Tables 4.16 and 4.17, 
Tukey's studentized range test, the Bonferroni t test, and 
Scheffe's test indicate statistically significant 
differences across market types with market proxies, and 
insignificant differences with non-market proxies.
The results of these integrated tests support the 
marginal t tests reported earlier: use of market-oriented
investor sentiment proxies result in failure to reject the 
PRNI hypothesis, while analyses using non-market proxies 
lead to rejection of the hypothesis.9 There exist two 
possible explanations for this set of circumstances.
Either the market proxies are representative of investor 
sentiment and the non-market proxies are not, or neither 
group of proxies characterizes investor sentiment and the 
market proxies are capturing some entirely different 
phenomenon (or phenomena).
Marginal analyses are also conducted using a 
nonparametric test (Corrado, 1989) and an event study 
method that corrects for event-induced variance (Boehmer, 
et.al., 1991). The results of these analyses are similar 
to those reported above.
Finally, it should be pointed out that a statistically 
significant positive announcement effect is observed even 
during periods categorized as "bear" for all proxies of 
investor sentiment investigated. For one non-market proxy 
(the CCS), bear month APEs are larger than those of bull 
and normal months. For market proxies of investor 
sentiment (Up/Down Markets, SUD Months and Six Month 
Periods) the bear period announcement day APEs are much 
smaller than those observed during bull periods, but 
positive, nonetheless. If investor sentiment is symmetric 
and periods of low market returns induce pessimism, then 
these returns are smaller than those that might be expected 
based on strictly on the economic effects of the 
restructuring. Therefore, it appears that though investor 
sentiment may play a role in the positive stock price 
reaction to the announcement of a spinoff, it cannot be the 
sole explanation for the observed response.
CHAPTER 5: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
5.1. Data and Method
5.1.1. Portfolio Analysis Sample
The data used in the analysis of the long-term effects 
on shareholder wealth are a subset of that used in the 
event study analysis. More information is required to 
create and analyze the performance of spinoff portfolios; 
observations are "lost" whenever information on the
subsidiary firm, for example, is unavailable.
Specifically, for this analysis of the long-term or 
portfolio effects of corporate spinoffs it is required 
that:
1) the spun off subsidiary be traded on either the New York 
or American exchanges, or on NASDAQ, and
2) at least three years (720 days) of trading data be 
available for both the parent and subsidiary following 
the ex-date, (and prior to the ex-date as well, but the 
latter constraint was not violated by any firm in the 
sample)
3) the ex-date be reported.1
Of the total sample of 156 firms, the spun off 
subsidiaries of 144 are traded on one of the three above­
listed exchanges. Table 5.1 presents the number of parent 
and spun off firms that trade on each exchange. The
remaining 12 are either offshore subsidiaries of a US
’For several firms in the event study sample, no ex-date is 
reported in Moody’s Dividend Record. A statement such as MNo ex- 
dividend date has been set by the NYSE" appeared where the ex­
date is typically reported. These firms are deleted from the 
portfolio analysis sample.
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parent that do not trade on a US exchange, firms that are 
listed on a regional exchange, or firms that changed names 
during the spinoff process and remain undetected by this 
investigation. For 54 of the 144 firms for which price 
information is available, either:
1) one or both of the parent and subsidiary firms listed 
for less than the requisite three years,
2) or the ex-date was not reported.
Accordingly, the final sample for portfolio analysis 
consists of 90 firms. Summary statistics for the size of 
the parent and subsidiary firms, as well as relative size 
are presented in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.1
SPINOFF FIRMS BY EXCHANGE LISTING
Parent Subsidiary
NYSE 71 41
ASE 39 21
OTC 46 82
156 144
TABLE 5.2
SUMMARY SIZE STATISTICS FOR PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 
(Parent & Subsidiaries in 000's, Relative Statistics in %)
__________ N MEAN_________MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Parent 90 $1,218,341 290,854 1,252 14,691,094
Subs 90 227,836 59,675 2,305 2,767,856
Relative 90 24.71 16.38 1.76 96.68
Size
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Both the parents and subsidiary firms are larger for the 
subset of companies for which sufficient information is 
available for the portfolio analysis. This result is not 
surprising, since more information tends to be available 
for larger firms. Relative size, however, remains 
essentially unchanged (24.71% vs 25.16%).
5.1.2. Portfolio Analysis Method
Although the short-term announcement effects of 
corporate spinoffs have been examined in some detail, the 
long-term effects on shareholder wealth of this form of 
corporate restructuring are left unexplored. As noted 
earlier, Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1991) (CMW) 
investigate the post-spinoff performance of a portfolio of 
spun off subsidiaries and find that this portfolio has 
returns that are superior to those of a market portfolio or 
one composed of a sample of matched firms.
However, CMW investigate only the post ex-dividend 
date (day on which the parent and subsidiary begin trading 
as separate entities) performance of the spun off firms 
ignoring the performance of the parent company. Parent 
firms are typically much larger than spun off subsidiaries; 
the performance of the former is more important than that 
of the latter in determining overall efficiency accruing to 
the investor. Therefore, the post-event performance of
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both the parent and subsidiary firms are investigated in 
the following analysis.
Another issue that has thus far not been addressed in 
the finance literature is the relative risk-adjusted 
performance of demerged firms before and after the event of 
the spinoff. A useful technique for examining the general 
performance of groups of firms is to create portfolios 
consisting of the firms under investigation, and then 
evaluate the performance of the portfolio. In the demerger 
case, two portfolios are created: one comprising the pre­
spinoff parent firms, and another composed of the post­
spinoff parent and subsidiary firms. The relative risk- 
adjusted performance of these two portfolios has 
implications for the general success of corporate spinoffs 
as a shareholder wealth-enhancing strategy.
If it is found that the post-spinoff portfolio has a 
risk-adjusted return superior to that of the pre-spinoff 
portfolio, then this may be interpreted as evidence 
supporting the idea that spinoffs increase shareholder 
wealth, on average. Similarly, if the risk-adjusted 
performance of the two portfolios is not significantly 
different, then on average, shareholder wealth has been 
enhanced (by the amount of the increase in share price on 
the announcement day). On the other hand, if the post­
spinoff portfolio underperforms the pre-spinoff portfolio
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on a risk-adjusted basis, the generally accepted view that 
demergers increase shareholder wealth can be questioned.
In order to compare the risk-adjusted return of the 
pre and post-spinoff portfolios (Before and After 
portfolios, respectively), the sample of firms that have 
announced and subsequently undertaken a divestiture of a 
business segment via spinoff is created, as described in 
Section 5.1.1.
As reported above, the final sample consists of 90 
firms. The pre-spinoff evaluation period begins three 
years (72 0 trading days) prior to each firm's ex-date and 
ends the day before the ex-date. The 90 days immediately 
prior to the announcement of the spinoff and the two-day 
event window are excluded from the analysis so as to 
abstract from the share price effects directly associated 
with the spinoff announcement. The post-spinoff evaluation 
period begins on the ex-date and ends three years after 
this date for parent firms. For subsidiary firms, the 
evaluation period begins on the first day the stock begins 
trading and ends 720 trading days later.2 Naturally, the 
After portfolio is twice as large as the Before portfolio 
(180 vs 90 firms).
Generally, the first trading day is within two weeks 
of the ex-date. For firms which trade on a when-issued 
basis, stock price data is gathered from Standard & Poors 
Daily Stock Price Records.
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Three different measures of portfolio performance are 
used to achieve a broad assessment of the risk/return 
characteristics of the two portfolios. Perhaps the most 
appropriate measures of portfolio performance for the 
purposes of this analysis are those that consider 
systematic risk as the true estimate of risk. Since it is 
unlikely that any investor would retain all of his wealth 
in a portfolio consisting exclusively of spinoff firms, 
non-diversifiable risk should be a more valid gauge than 
total risk.
The Treynor measure of portfolio performance examines 
"excess" return (above that of the risk-free asset) when /3 
is the risk measure. The Treynor measure appears as:
(Rp - Rf) //3P
where
M
Rt = 2 rit,
t=i
M = number of days in evaluation period, 
rit = return for security i on day t,
N
Rp = S W; Rt 
i=l
N = number of firms in portfolio,
W4 = proportion of firm i's equity value to the summed 
equity value of all firms in portfolio,3
3The weight of each firm is the ratio of its average 
equity value across the three year evaluation period to the 
total average equity value for all firms in the portfolio.
Rf = return on the risk-free asset,
ft = CovXRuEml 
<72(Rm)
R,,, = return on the market portfolio,
N
ft = 2 Wj ft.
i=l
Before and After portfolio excess returns and j8s are 
calculated in the above described manner.4 In this 
analysis daily stock returns from the CRSP Master daily 
file are used. The risk-free rate is proxied by the 30-day 
Treasury-bill rate. Excess return is annualized (excess 
return over three year period/three) to provide a more 
familiar measure of return. Since /3 estimates vary 
depending on the market proxy chosen, three market indices 
are used for the market return. These three benchmark 
portfolios are the value-weighted CRSP index, the equal- 
weighted CRSP index, and the Standard & Poors 500 index.
Another measure of portfolio performance using j3 as 
the measure of risk is the Jensen performance index. This 
measure is:
f t t  “  f t t  =  a p +  f t ( R m t  — f t t )  +  e pt
4However, since this analysis is being conducted over 
event rather than calendar time, the risk-free return (R^ 
is also a "portfolio", with the values of the monthly 
Treasury bill rate being weighted by the portfolio weight 
of the firm with which it is associated.
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Procedura1ly, weekly (five trading days) portfolio returns 
are computed, then the contemporaneous risk-free rate of 
return is subtracted to create the weekly excess return. 
Excess returns so obtained are regressed against the weekly 
market risk premium (market return less risk-free return) 
using OLS. Naturally, this means that for the three year 
(720 trading days) evaluation period, the number of 
observations used in the regression is 144 and that 48 
observations are available for the yearly analyses.
If the portfolio under investigation earns more than 
the "normal" (Jensen's term) risk premium for its level of 
risk, the intercept term (a) will be significantly 
positive. Conversely, a will be negative for any portfolio 
that earns a return less than that commensurate with its 
systematic risk. Portfolios earning a normal return for 
the level of non-diversifiable risk borne will have a's not 
significantly different from zero.
The use of this measure to assess portfolio 
performance is problematic, of course, since Roll (1978) 
demonstrates that rankings of portfolio performance can 
vary with different benchmark portfolios. However,
Peterson and Rice (1980) use the Jensen measure (as well as 
the Sharpe and Treynor measures) to rank the performance of 
fifteen mutual funds using four different benchmark 
portfolios. Examining the degree of correlation between 
rankings and across benchmark portfolios, the authors
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report that "little change in ranking occurred when the 
market index was varied".
Therefore, although ambiguous evidence may result from 
the use of the Jensen measure, it can be a meaningful 
technique for assessing portfolio performance, especially 
when combined with other portfolio performance evaluation 
methods. In this analysis three market proxies are used to 
mitigate (and examine) the severity of the variable ranking 
problem for this particular dataset.
Finally, the (excess) return to variability measure 
first proposed by Sharpe (1966) is used to evaluate the 
comparative performance of portfolios of spinoff firms 
before and after the event. The Sharpe measure is defined 
as:
(Rp - Rf)/av
where
orp = the standard deviation of portfolio p.
This criterion defines total risk as the risk relevant to 
holders of the portfolio when, in fact, systematic risk is 
more likely to be germane, as discussed above. However, 
when combined with the results of the Treynor and Jensen 
indices, the results of an analysis using the Sharpe index 
provides additional information with respect to the risk- 
return characteristics of the two portfolios to be 
compared.
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Next, the performance of both the Before and After 
portfolios is analyzed on a year by year basis. This is in 
order to ascertain patterns over time in the risk and 
market-adjusted returns for each of the two portfolios.
The After portfolio is also decomposed into parent and 
subsidiary portfolios, which are evaluated using the three 
techniques described above. This analysis provides 
evidence regarding the source of After portfolio risk- 
adjusted returns.
If the division of the firm into two entities has 
little effect on the risk-return characteristics of the 
spinoff firms in general, the differences in pre and post­
spinoff portfolio performance will be small. Therefore, it 
will not be possible to draw a clear conclusion regarding 
the long-term effectiveness of the spinoff decision.
In order to more clearly differentiate the two 
portfolios, an empirical test is conducted to determine 
whether or not there exists a statistically significant 
difference between estimates of the parameters of the 
market model for the combined (pre-spinoff) and separated 
(post-spinoff) firms. The Chow test is used to determine 
whether changes in parameter estimates are statistically 
significant. The formulation of the Chow test is as 
follows.
The market model appears as:
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Ri, t a i  + Pi^in, t
where
R;t = return on stock i at time t,
^  = return on market at time t
To test whether the estimates of the parameters of the 
market model change for each firm after the spinoff, the 
unrestricted model is estimated and appears as:
R=
« i
R 1
2^ 0 Pi
*2 0 m2 «2
+ U
P2
Note that the estimates for both the intercepts and slopes 
may be different before and after spinoff in this 
formulation. An ordinary least squares regression produces 
vectors /3 (slope vector) and e (residual vector) . The j3 
vector appears as:
P =  (MM) _1MR
and e'e is the unrestricted residual sum of squares.
The null hypothesis of no difference between the parameters 
estimates of the market model before and after the spinoff 
appears as:
The restricted model is as follows
' * x
[?]+“
from this equation, the restricted residual sum of squares 
e*'e* can be calculated. Then, the S statistic is computed 
usinq the formula:
S=-
(e;e.-6e)
ee
(n-k)
■ ~F,(q, n-Jc)
where
q = the number of restrictions, 
k = number of parameters
n = nj + n2 = total number of observations.
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If the value of the test statistic exceeds the critical 
value of the F statistic then the null hypothesis of no 
change in the parameters of the market model post-spinoff 
may be rejected.
For firms that display a statistically significant 
difference in the parameter estimates of the market model 
before and after the spinoff, the long-term shareholder 
wealth effects of corporate spinoffs are investigated using 
the Treynor, Jensen, and Sharpe measures.
Finally, portfolios are created using the timing of 
the announcement of the spinoff as selection criterion.
That is, portfolios are created based on whether a firm 
announced its spinoff during a bull or a bear market (using 
the definitions of bull/bear markets used in the event 
study analysis.) Evaluation of the before spinoff/after 
spinoff risk-adjusted performance of these portfolios is 
conducted using the above-described techniques to ascertain 
whether the timing of the demerger announcement affects the 
long-term performance of spinoff firms in general.
The method described above conducts the portfolio 
performance analysis over event time. The portfolios thus 
constructed are in some sense fictional, since this 
technique presumes that each firm's ex-date is the same as 
that of all other firms. Although appropriate for 
evaluating the long-term wealth effects of a corporate 
event, this approach does not address the returns actually
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available to investors. An alternative procedure is to 
conduct the analysis over calendar, rather than event time. 
The focus of this investigation is the risk-adjusted 
returns available to investors who purchase the shares of 
spinoff firms two years prior to the ex-date and hold these 
shares for two years after the ex-date. Therefore, firms 
are added to the portfolio on the date 24 months prior (480 
trading days) to their respective ex-dates and removed 24 
months after their ex-date.
Rather than a comparison of pre and post-spinoff 
portfolio performance, the calendar time analysis examines 
the risk-adjusted returns actually available to investors 
who hold portfolios of spinoff firms throughout the 
demerger process. Note that the pre-announcement period 
and two-day event window returns are not excluded in this 
analysis. The calendar time portfolios consist of the 90 
firms that are examined in the event time analysis. The 
firms are segregated into three portfolios, using the year 
in which the parent firm went ex-dividend as the criterion 
by which portfolios are constructed.
Accordingly, the first portfolio consists of firms for 
which the ex-date occurred between January 1970 and 
December 1980. The second portfolio consists of firms for 
which the ex-date occurred between January 1980 and 
December 1985. Firms for which the ex-date occurred 
between January 1986 and December 1988 comprise the third
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portfolio. Risk-return characteristics of these portfolios 
are analyzed using the portfolio performance measurement 
techniques described above. The contribution of the 
calendar time analysis is to examine risk-adjusted returns 
that are actually available to investors from spinoff firms 
that exist contemporaneously.
5.2. Portfolio Analysis Results
5.2.1. Performance of the Full Sample Portfolio
Evaluation of the performance of the Before and After 
portfolios on a market and risk-adjusted basis yields the 
results presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The annualized 
excess returns for the Before and After portfolios are 
presented in Panel A of Table 5.3. The After portfolio 
displays an annualized excess return of approximately 14.7 
percent, while the annualized return for the Before 
portfolio is approximately 11.5 percent. The difference 
between the excess returns of these two portfolios is not 
statistically significant at the .05 level.5
Recall that the evaluation period for the Before 
portfolio does not include the ninety days prior to the 
announcement of the spinoff or the two day announcement 
window. The After portfolio also has greater returns (or 
smaller negative returns in the case of the equal-weighted
5A t-test of difference in means is conducted on the 
daily portfolio excess return for the Before and After 
portfolios. This t-statistic is 1.49.
CRSP index) than the Before portfolio on a market-adjusted 
basis for all three of the proxies for market return.
TABLE 5.3
FULL SAMPLE THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Annualized Excess and Market-Adjus ted Returns
Before After
Portfolio Portfolio
Annualized Excess Return 11.46 14.69
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 2.19 6.35
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted -4.53 -0.88
S&P 500 Adjusted 7.14 9.95
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Before After
Valued-Weighted a 0.0007 0.0001
CRSP Index 0 1.082 1.025
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Before After
Equal-Weighted a -0.0002 -0.0001
CRSP Index 0 1.125 1.093
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Before After
Standard & a 0.0002 -0.0001
Poors 500 0 1.008 1.093
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TABLE 5.4
FULL SAMPLE THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /crp
Trevnor's Measure
Value Equal
Benchmark Weighted Weighted S&P Sharpe's
CRSP CRSP 500 Measure
Before Portfolio 0.106 0.102 0.114 26.96
After Portfolio 0.143 0.134 0.134 21.02
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R p t  “  R ft)  =  “ p +  /3 p (R m t  “  R ft)  +  e pt
Before Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equa1-We ighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0309 (0.26) -0.0890 (-1.36) 0.0509 (2.21*)
P 1.394 (13.65**) 1.316 (11.05**) 1.358 (13.63**
After Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0743 (1.51) -0.0496 (-0.96) 0.0964 (1.99*)
P 0.690 (6.23**) 0.596 (5.36**) 0.686 (6.48**)
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level
Interestingly, both portfolios have positive market 
adjusted returns when the S&P 500 and the CRSP value- 
weighted indices are used as the market proxy. In 
contrast, negative returns are observed for each portfolio 
for the equal-weighted CRSP index. This pattern of greater 
returns for the CRSP equally-weighted index relative to the 
other two indices is observed throughout the analysis of 
portfolio performance. One possible explanation for the 
superior performance of the equally-weighted index is the 
small firm effect; the S&P 500 consists primarily of large 
capitalization firms and the value-weighted index, 
naturally, is more heavily influenced by the performance of 
larger firms.6 If small firms earn risk-adjusted returns 
that are greater than those earned by large capitalization 
firms, this would be reflected in higher returns for an 
equally-weighted index than a value-weighted index 
consisting of the same firms or an index comprised 
primarily of large firms.
Examining risk-adjusted performance (Table 5.4, Panels 
A and B), the After portfolio again outperforms the Before 
portfolio. Specifically, since Before and After average 
portfolio j8s are almost the same, (Before = 1.072, After =
1.070) values for the Treynor measure of portfolio 
performance reflect the relationship between the annualized
6For a discussion of the small firm effect, see 
Reinganum (1981) or Roll (1982).
excess returns of the two portfolios. The After portfolio 
is exactly twice as large as the Before portfolio so it 
might be expected that the standard deviation of the former 
is larger than that of the latter. On the other hand, half 
of the After portfolio is comprised of small firms (the 
spun off firms) that yield returns that tend to be more 
volatile than those of the larger firms that comprise the 
Before portfolio. In fact, the standard deviation of the 
daily portfolio return over the three year evaluation 
period of the Before portfolio is lower than that of its 
After counterpart (.0043 vs .0069). Therefore, the result 
obtained using the Sharpe measure of portfolio performance 
is not consistent with that obtained with Treynor's 
measure; the Sharpe measure indicates superior performance 
for the Before portfolio. For this sample of spinoff 
firms, the demerger has virtually no effect on systematic 
risk, but increases the level of total risk of the 
portfolio.
Finally, the Jensen measure of portfolio performance 
(Table 5.4, Panel B), using three proxies for the market 
return, indicates abnormal performance in the case of both 
the Before and After portfolios when compared to the excess 
return on the S&P 500 index. (T statistics are in 
parentheses.) This abnormal performance is significantly 
positive, but is not supported by results obtained using 
the CRSP value and equally-weighted indices as market
1 0 1
proxies. Note that estimates of the /3 coefficient for 
Jensen's measure seem unusually high for the Before 
portfolio (average = 1.36), and unusually low for the After 
portfolio (average = 0.66). These results can be 
attributed to the fact that the analysis is being conducted 
over event, rather than calendar time.
5.2.2. Performance of Before Portfolio
An examination of the performance of the Before 
portfolio on a yearly basis is presented in Tables 5.5 and 
5.6. The designation "one year prior" denotes the 240 
trading day period immediately before the ex-date for each 
firm in the spinoff portfolio. (Excluding, of course, the 
90 day pre-announcement period and the two day event 
window.) Similarly, "two years prior" represents the 240 
day trading period between the 241st and 480th (inclusive) 
trading days prior to the spinoff. Finally, the "three 
years prior" period is comprised of the 240 trading days 
between the 481st and 720th trading days before the ex-date 
for each demerger firm in the portfolio.
The decomposition of Before portfolio results over the 
total evaluation period into each of the three component 
years reveals relatively even performance for excess 
returns. Raw excess returns seem to be flat over the 
periods two and three years before the spinoff, and then
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TABLE 5.5
FULL SAMPLE BEFORE THE EX-DATE
Panel A
Yearly Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns
Annualized Excess Return 
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
S&P 500 Adjusted
1st Year 
Prior 
8.75 
8.01 
3.84 
11.95
2nd Year 
Prior 
12.68 
-2.75 
-15.12 
2.35
3 rd Year 
Prior 
11.35 
6.72 
6.51 
9.60
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter
1 Year 
Prior
2 Years 
Prior
3 Years 
Prior
Valued-Weighted 
CRSP Index
0!
0
-0.0002
1.125
-0.0002
1.138
0.0004
0.925
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter
1 Year 
Prior
2 Years 
Prior
3 Years 
Prior
Equa1-Weighted 
CRSP Index
a
0
-0.0003
1.179
-0.0008
1.272
0.0003
1.020
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter
1 Year 
Prior
2 Years 
Prior
3 Years 
Prior
Standard & 
Poors 500
0!
0
0.0001
1.062
0.0001
1.057
0.0005
0.856
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TABLE 5.6
Panel A
Benchmark
1 Year Prior
2 Years Prior
3 Years Prior
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R pt “  R ft) =  a p $ p (R m t ~  R ft) e pt
One Year Prior to Ex-Date
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted 
CRSP Index
Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index
S&P
500
0.0665 (1.61) 0.0890 (1.36) 0.0509 (1.89f)
1.421 (9.84**) 1.419 (8.36**) 1.390 (9.58**)
TWO Years Prior to .Ex-Date
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
•0.1066 (-0.89) -0.2661 (-2.02*) 0.0235 (0.463)
1.675 (7.26**) 1.608 (5.89**) 1.586 (7.12**)
Three Years Prior to Ex-Date
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0778 (1.00) 0.1039 (1.19) 0.1210 (1.63)
|3 0.990 (5.73**) 0.829 (4.18**) 0.982 (5.95**)
** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level
f Significant at the .10 level
FULL SAMPLE BEFORE THE EX-DATE 
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)/@p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap
 Trevnor's Measure
Value Equal
Weighted Weighted S&P Sharpe's 
CRSP CRSP 500 Measure
0.079 0.074 0.082 18.08
0.111 0.099 0.120 29.35
0.123 0.111 0.133 32.33
104
decline slightly in the year immediately prior to the 
spinoff. However, on a market-adjusted basis, the Before 
portfolio shows the best performance in the first year 
prior to the spinoff, with market-adjusted return actually 
negative for the second year prior to the spinoff for two 
of the market proxies. The relatively good market-adjusted 
performance of the Before portfolio in the year immediately 
prior to the spinoff may reflect information leakage before 
the 90 day pre-announcement period for some firms in the 
portfolio.
On a risk-adjusted basis (Table 5.6, Panel A),
Treynor1s measure indicates that the performance of the 
Before portfolio is best in the third year prior to the 
spinoff (average Treynor's index = .122) and worst in the 
year immediately prior to the spinoff. Similarly, Sharpe's 
measure suggests that portfolio performance is best during 
the third year prior to the spinoff.
For the Jensen measure, the results show that 
performance during the first year prior to the spinoff is 
significantly positive when compared to the S&P 500 index. 
In contrast, performance during the second year prior to 
the spinoff is significantly negative when measured against 
the equally-weighted CRSP index. In summary, it appears 
that the risk-adjusted performance of the Before portfolio 
is best during the third year before the spinoff and best
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on a market-adjusted basis during the year immediately 
prior to the spinoff.
5.2.3. Performance of After Portfolio
An examination of the performance of the After 
portfolio on a yearly basis is presented in Tables 5.7 and 
5.8. The period designated "first year after" represents 
the 240 trading days immediately following the ex-dividend 
date of each firm in the portfolio. "Second year after" 
and "third year after" periods consist of trading days 241- 
480 and 481-720 relative to the ex-date, respectively.
Of the three years constituting the sample period, the 
After portfolio displays the best performance during the 
second year following the spinoff, on both a raw excess 
return and market-adjusted return basis. The above-market 
returns reported for the After portfolio appear to be 
concentrated in the second year following the spinoff, with 
returns over the first and third years approximating those 
of the market proxies. These results are consistent with 
those of Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1991), who report 
that spun off subsidiaries show the strongest market- 
adjusted performance during the second year after the 
spinoff. These authors also report relatively poor 
performance over the first year (primarily because of poor
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performance in the distribution month), but good 
performance during the third year following the spinoff.7
TABLE 5.7
FULL SAMPLE AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A
Yearly Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
After After After
Annualized Excess Return 2.77 20.09 13.32
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 0.89 10.55 2.16
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 2.32 4.85 -5.66
S&P 500 Adjusted 4.04 13.12 3.05
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
After After After
Valued-We ighted a -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005
CRSP Index 0 1.096 1.084 0.855
Parameter Estimates
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
Benchmark Parameter After After After
Equal-Weighted a -0.0026 -0.0001 0.0001
CRSP Index 0 1.200 1.221 0.976
Parameter Estimates
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
Benchmark Parameter After After After
Standard & a 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006
Poors 500 0 1.028 1.007 0.791
7Mean raw return for subsidiaries over the 
distribution month for CMW's sample: -0.09%. Mean raw 
return for subsidiaries over the distribution month for 
this sample: -0.19%.
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TABLE 5.8
FULL SAMPLE AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /<rp
Trevnor's Measure
Value Equal
Benchmark Weighted Weighted S&P Sharpe':
CRSP CRSP 500 Measure
1st Year After 0.025 0.023 0.027 4.44
2nd Year After 0.185 0.165 0.199 25.93
3rd Year After 0.155 0.136 0.168 19.33
Panel b Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance 
(Rpt “ Rft) = 0!p + /3p (Rmt “ Rft) + ®pt
First Year After Ex-Date
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
0.0808 (0.83) 0.0503 (1.43) 0.0953 (1.41)
0.550 (3.00**) 0.552 (3.09**) 0.561 (3.19**)
Second Year After Ex-Date
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
0.1151 (1.74f) 0.0704 (0.74) 0.1391 (1.95f)
0.822 (5.11**) 0.900 (5.29**) 0.785 (5.02**)
Third Year After Ex-Date
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
0.0303 (0.42) 0.0128 (0.16) -0.0539 (-0.76)
0.718 (5.64**) 0.543 (4.05**) 0.714 (5.88**)
** Significant at the .01 level 
t Significant at the .10 level
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For this sample, spinoff portfolio returns over the third 
year following the demerger outperform the value-weighted 
CRSP and S&P 500 index market proxies, but not the equal- 
weighted CRSP index. (The Jensen measure indicates, 
nevertheless, that these differences are not statistically 
significant.)
Risk-adjusted returns over the second year following 
the spinoff are also superior to those of the other two 
years comprising the sample period. The average Treynor 
measure (across market proxies) is larger for the second 
year (.183) than for either the first (.025) or third 
(.153) years. Similarly, the Sharpe measure of portfolio 
performance is largest for the second year. The Jensen 
measure reveals that the only significantly positive a's 
are observed during the second year following the spinoff 
using the value-weighted CRSP and the S&P 500 indices as 
market proxies. In summary, the performance of the After 
portfolio during the second year following the spinoff 
appears to be superior to that of the market in general 
(for the market proxies used here). The performance of the 
spinoff portfolio during the first and third years 
following the demerger is not significantly different from 
that of the market.
5.2.4. After Portfolio by Parent and Subsidiary
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The After portfolio is separated into two portfolios; 
one comprised of parent firms and the other consisting of 
subsidiary firms. This decomposition allows analysis of 
the relative contribution of parent and subsidiary firms to 
overall portfolio performance. Annualized excess returns 
and market-adjusted returns are presented in Table 5.9.
TABLE 5.9
Panel A
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY PORTFOLIOS 
Three Years After Ex-Date
Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns
Annualized Excess Return 
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
S&P 500 Adjusted
Parent
Portfolio
15.27
6.93
-0.30
10.53
Subsidiary
Portfolio
11.31
2.97
-4.26
6.57
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Parent Subsidiarv
Valued-Weighted a 0.0001 0.0004
CRSP Index 0 1.068 0.772
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Parent Subsidiary
Equal-Weighted a 0.0001 0.0001
CRSP Index 13 1.107 1.015
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Parent Subsidiary
Standard & a -0.0001 0.0001
Poors 500 0 1.106 1.016
1 1 0
TABLE 5.10
Panel A
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY PORTFOLIOS 
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap
Trevnor's Measure
Benchmark
Value Equal
Weighted Weighted
CRSP CRSP
Parent Portfolio 0.143 0.153
Subsidiary Portfolio 0.147 0.111
S&P
500
0.138
0.111
Sharpe's 
Measure 
31.42 
13.79
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance 
(Rpt ”  Rft) ^ p ( R m t  —  Rft) ®pt
Parent Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0140 (1.54) -0.0011 (-1.38) 0.0173 (2.34*)
0 0.693 (6.28**) 0.599 (5.41**) 0.688 (6.52**)
Subsidiary Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
0!
&
Value-Weighted 
CRSP Index 
0.0012 (0.69)
0.797 (4.42**)
Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index 
-0.0154 (-0.30)
0.863 (4.66**)
S&P
500
0.0212 (1.18) 
0.716 (4.15**)
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .05 level
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Table 5.10 contains risk-adjusted returns for the Parent 
and Subsidiary portfolios.
Over the three year post-spinoff evaluation period, 
the Parent portfolio outperforms the Subsidiary portfolio 
on both a raw excess return and market-adjusted excess 
return basis. However, a comparison of the mean daily 
excess portfolio returns does not indicate a statistically 
significant difference between the return of the two 
portfolios. Surprisingly, systematic risk, as measured by 
average portfolio /3 across market proxies, is lower for the 
Subsidiary portfolio (0.93) than for the Parent portfolio 
(1.09). This result is unexpected since subsidiary firms 
are typically much smaller than the parent firms, and thus 
might have larger /8s. The Subsidiary portfolio estimate 
for the value-weighted CRSP index (0.77) is considerably 
lower than that for the other two indices (avg. = 1.02). 
This result may indicate the inappropriateness of the 
value-weighted CRSP index as a benchmark portfolio for a 
sample of small firms.
The average Treynor measure for the Parent portfolio 
is .144 and the corresponding average measure for the 
Subsidiary portfolio is .123, indicating superior risk- 
adjusted performance by the former, despite the lower /3 of 
the latter. It should be noted, however, that the 
estimate computed using the value-weighted CRSP index 
influences these results; the average Treynor measure for
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the Subsidiary portfolio using only the equal-weighted and 
S&P 500 indices is .111. Total risk as measured by 
portfolio standard deviation is considerably higher for the 
Subsidiary portfolio (.0082 vs .0048), and thus the Sharpe 
measure indicates superior risk-adjusted performance by the 
Parent portfolio. Evaluating results from the Jensen 
measure of portfolio performance, significant abnormal 
performance is observed only for the Parent portfolio when 
using the S&P 500 index.
These results for the Subsidiary portfolio are similar 
to those reported by CMW for their sample of spun off 
firms; however, the portfolio return for this sample is 
somewhat smaller than the portfolio return described by 
CMW. These authors report an annualized three year return 
of 27.4 percent, while the annualized three year return for 
this sample of subsidiary (spun off) firms is 20.6 
percent.8 Consequently, the market-adjusted annualized 
return for this sample is also smaller than that reported 
by CMW, and is not significantly greater than any of the 
three market proxies used. Choice of market proxy is 
important, however. Compared to the benchmark portfolio 
used by CMW (the S&P 500), this sample of spun off firms
8The difference between the results obtained by CMW 
and those for this sample may be partially explained by the 
fact that CMW1s sample consists of 21 firms (of a total of 
146) that are merged into another firm during the 
evaluation period. The positive and statistically 
significant abnormal returns accruing to merger targets may 
influence the returns for CMW's sample portfolio.
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has positive market adjusted returns but compared to the 
equal-weighted CRSP index, market adjusted returns are 
negative. Although CMW use the S&P 500 as their market 
proxy, it is by no means clear that this index of 
(relatively) large firms is an appropriate benchmark with 
which to evaluate the performance of a portfolio of small 
firms.
5.3. Portfolio Performance When a Post-Spinoff Change in
the Estimates of the Market Model Parameters is
Detected
In order to examine changes in the risk-return 
characteristics of firms that have undertaken a spinoff, a 
subset of the complete spinoff portfolio is created. The 
criterion for any given firm's inclusion in this new 
portfolio is a statistically significant change in the 
estimates of the parameters of the market model after the 
demerger. Of the full sample of 90 firms, for 34 it is 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of no statistically 
significant change in the parameters of the market model 
after the spinoff. This sample of 34 firms is designated 
the "Reject" portfolio. The Reject portfolio is expected 
to be comprised of firms that have experienced the most 
dramatic changes in risk-return characteristics, and thus a 
comparison of Before and After portfolios may clarify 
results observed in the full sample spinoff portfolio. The 
results obtained in an analysis of the risk-return 
performance of a portfolio of firms for which there is a
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significant change in the estimates of the parameters of 
the market model after the event of the spinoff (the Reject 
portfolio) are somewhat surprising.
It was expected that the results of this analysis 
would amplify the changes observed in the risk-return 
characteristics for the portfolio of all firms in the 
sample.
TABLE 5.11
REJECT PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Annualized Excess and Market-Adjus ted Returns
Before After
Portfolio Portfolio
Annualized Excess Return 8.73 5.93
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 1.18 1.64
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted -5.62 -9.94
S&P 500 Adjusted 6.03 1.86
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Before After
Valued-Weighted a 0.0001 -0.0002
CRSP Index (3 1.109 1.069
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Parameter Before After
Equal-Weighted a -0.0002 -0.0001
CRSP Index (3 1.126 1.104
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark 
Standard & 
Poors 500
Parameter Before 
a 0.0002
/? 1.036
After
0.0003
0.992
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TABLE 5.12
REJECT PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /dp
______Treynor's Measure
Benchmark
Before Portfolio 
After Portfolio
Value 
Weighted 
CRSP 
0. 079 
0.055
Equal
Weighted
CRSP
0.078
0.054
S&P
500
0.084
0.060
Sharpe's 
Measure 
10.25
5.59
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R p t  ”  R f t )  =  a P +  p ( ^ m t  ”  R f t )  e pt
Before Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted 
CRSP Index
Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index
S&P
500
a 0.0846 (0.48) -0.0874 (-0.46) 0.1314 (0.77)
fi 0.863 (5.24**) 0.744 (4.08**) 0.861 (5.61**)
After Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0719 (0.62) -0.0313 (-0.26) 0.1039 (0.91)
0 0.654 (5.71**) 0.604 (5.33**) 0.636 (5.72**)
** Significant at the .01 level
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That is, since the risk-return characteristics of each 
firm in the Reject portfolio have been altered more than 
those of the average firm in the larger (full sample) 
portfolio, it seems likely that analysis of the smaller 
portfolio would reveal risk-return changes in the same 
direction, but of greater magnitude than those observed for 
the full sample.
Recall that the After portfolio outperforms the Before 
portfolio on both a market and risk-adjusted basis when the 
full sample is considered. However, for the sample of 
firms for which the null hypothesis of no significant 
change in the parameters of the market model can be 
rejected, the Before portfolio outperforms the After 
portfolio on both a market and risk-adjusted basis. (The 
difference is not statistically significant.) Explanations 
for the observed results differing from those expected 
include the possibility that firms most affected by the 
event of the spinoff are affected in a negative (at least 
in a risk-return sense) manner, while the general effect of 
the demerger is more benign and less pronounced. Why the 
effect is not more uniform across firms, of course, is the 
obvious question prompted by this scenario.
As reported above, the Before portfolio displays 
larger raw excess and market-adjusted returns than the 
After portfolio for this sample of firms. Systematic risk, 
as measured by /?, declines slightly for the Reject
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portfolio after the event of the spinoff (average Before =
1.09 vs average After = 1.06). However, this decline in 0 
is insufficient to induce superior risk-adjusted 
performance in the After portfolio as evaluated using the 
Treynor measure criterion. The fact the 0s for the Before 
and After portfolios are so similar is surprising, since 
this is a sample of firms that exhibits significantly 
different market model parameter estimates before and after 
the demerger. On the other hand, the difference between 
Before and After 0s is larger for this portfolio is larger 
than that for the full sample (for which the Before and 
After 0s are virtually identical) .
Total risk, as measured by portfolio standard 
deviation, is also similar for the Before and After 
portfolios, with the result that the Sharpe criterion 
indicates superior performance by the Before portfolio. 
Examination of the results of an analysis conducted using 
Jensen's measure reveals no significantly abnormal 
performance by either the Before or After portfolios.
5.4. Bull and Bear Market Portfolios
Since it appears that the short-term share price 
effect associated with the announcement of a corporate 
spinoff is influenced by prior period market returns, a 
natural extension of the event study analysis is to examine 
whether the timing of the announcement affects long-term
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share price performance. The long-term performance of 
demerger firms that make the spinoff announcement in bull 
markets versus the long-term performance of firms that 
announce the spinoff during bear markets is conducted using 
the same method used to analyze the relative long-term 
performance of previously discussed portfolios.
The particular definition of bull and bear markets 
used to create the portfolios is the "Six Month Periods" 
delineation. Recall that this categorization defines a 
bull (bear) market as a six month period during which the 
market return is positive (negative) for at least four of 
the six months prior to the announcement. Since the Six 
Months Periods definition of bull/bear markets provides 
large differentials between bull and bear market APE's in 
the event study analysis, it is believed to be a good 
candidate to examine differences in long-term performance 
associated with timing of the announcement. Use of this 
definition of bull/bear markets results in small portfolio 
sizes, however; the bull portfolio consists of 26 firms, 
and the bear portfolio 11. Performance of portfolios 
created using the bull/bear market announcement criteria is 
presented in Tables 5.13-5.14.
Excess returns for both the Before and After 
portfolios created using the Bull market announcement 
criterion are lower than their full sample counterparts. 
This result is surprising, since it might be expected that
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excess returns for a portfolio of stocks evaluated during a 
period of relatively high market returns would be superior 
to those of a portfolio of stocks chosen at random (with 
respect to contemporaneous market return).
TABLE 5.13
BULL MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns
Annualized Excess Return 
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
S&P 500 Adjusted
Before
Portfolio
9.98
2.55
-2.30
7.54
After
Portfolio
13.22
1.55
-7.30
5.35
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark 
Valued-Weighted 
CRSP Index
Parameter
a
0
Before
0.0002
1.026
Parameter
After
0.0003
0.961
Estimates
Benchmark 
Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index
Parameter
a
i8
Before
0.00003
1.149
Parameter
After
0.0001
1.119
Estimates
Benchmark 
Standard & 
Poors 500
Parameter
a
0
Before
0.0004
0.951
After
0.0005
0.880
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TABLE 5.14
BULL MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap
Trevnor1s Measure
Benchmark
Before Portfolio 
After Portfolio
Value 
Weighted 
CRSP 
0. 097 
0. 138
Equal 
Weighted S&P 
CRSP 500
0.087
0.118
0.105 
0.150
Sharpe's 
Measure
12.50
15.72
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance 
(Rpt - Rft) = aP + 0P(Rmt “ Rft) + ept
Before Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0093 (0.24) -0.0651 (-0.37) 0.0969 (1.54)
13 1.157 (5.86**) 1.086 (5.97**) 1.060 (5.62**)
After Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0415 (0.59) -0.0016 (-1.30) 0.0817 (1.19)
P 0.968 (7.33**) 0.917 (6.11**) 0.926 (7.50**)
** Significant at the .01 level
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Recall that the Six Month Periods bull market definition 
concerns the six month period prior to the announcement 
date, and that this analysis evaluates the portfolios over 
the three year period prior to and after each firm's ex­
date. Therefore, it is not clear that the evaluation 
period for the bull market portfolio should be a period of 
relatively high market returns.
While excess returns are larger for the After bull 
market portfolio, the Before portfolio returns are higher 
on a market-adjusted basis for two of the three market 
proxies. Consistent with results obtained for the Reject 
portfolios, systematic risk as measured by portfolio 0 
declines from the Before portfolio (avg.= 1.04) to the 
After portfolio (avg. = .99). As a result, the After 
portfolio displays superior risk-adjusted returns for each 
of the benchmark portfolios using the Treynor criterion. 
Total risk as measured by portfolio standard deviation 
increases for these firms as a result of the spinoff (.0079 
vs .0088). (Note that the small sample size of the bull 
market portfolio increases portfolio standard deviation 
over that of the full sample.) Nonetheless, results of an 
analysis using the Sharpe measure are consistent with those 
obtained using the Treynor measure; superior performance by 
the After portfolio. Portfolio performance as measured by 
Jensen's criterion is not significantly different from that 
of the three market proxies. In contrast to the results
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obtained for the bull market portfolio, the period of 
evaluation for the bear market Before portfolio appears to 
be truly "bear", with the annualized excess return on the 
Before portfolio the smallest observed for any portfolio 
(6.27%).
TABLE 5.15
BEAR MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns
Before After
Portfolio Portfolio
Annualized Excess Return 6.27 21.00
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 2.93 1.51
Equal-Weighed CRSP Adjusted -2.90 -6.31
S&P 500 Adjusted 7.44 6.27
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Benchmark 
Valued-Weighted 
CRSP Index
Parameter
a
0
Before 
0.0002 
1.089
Parameter
After
0.0002
0.974
Estimates
Benchmark 
Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index
Parameter
a.
(3
Before
-0.00002
1.195
Parameter
After
-0.0001
1.079
Estimates
Benchmark 
Standard & 
Poors 500
Parameter
a
0
Before
0.0003
1.008
After
0.0003
0.902
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TABLE 5.16
BEAR MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE 
Panel A
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)/fip 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /op
Trevnor's Measure_____
Benchmark
Before Portfolio 
After Portfolio
Value 
Weighted 
CRSP 
0.058 
0.215
Equal
Weighted
CRSP
0.053
0.195
S&P
500
0.062
0.233
Sharpe's 
Measure
4.60 
17.56
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(^pt “  ^ ft) t  0 p (^ m t _  ^ ft) ®pt
Before Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.2420 (1.09) -0.2999 (-0.11) 0.2931 (1.31)
0 1.077 (6.23**) 1.094 (4.90**) 0.996 (6.17**
After Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0076 (0.11) -0.0972 (-0.72) 0.0525 (0.96)
0 1.216 (8.59**) 1.099 (7.90**) 1.156 (8.41**
** Significant at the .01 level
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This result cannot be attributed to unusually poor 
performance by the Before portfolio, since market adjusted 
returns are comparable to those observed for portfolios 
throughout this analysis. The After portfolio, on the 
other hand, has relatively large excess returns (21.0%, 
which is significantly different from the excess return 
earned by the Before portfolio at the .05 level) and rather 
typical market adjusted returns, indicating a higher level 
of market return during the post-spinoff evaluation period.
Average portfolio /3 declines slightly (by .101) as 
does portfolio standard deviation (.014 vs .012) after the 
spinoff. These results, combined with the superior excess 
return performance of the After portfolio, suggest superior 
risk-adjusted performance by the After portfolio. Again, 
the Jensen measure reveals no significantly abnormal 
performance.
Based on the above results, it does not appear that 
the type of market in which a spinoff is announced has a 
pronounced effect on the long-term shareholder wealth 
effects of the demerger. That is, although differences in 
excess returns for the Before and After portfolios for the 
bear announcements are greater than those observed for any 
Before/After pair in this analysis, when the portfolio 
returns are adjusted for contemporaneous market return, 
these differences become very small. Similarly, market
i
adjusted returns for both bull and bear announcements (for
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Before and After portfolios) are comparable to those of 
portfolios constructed without regard to the level of 
investor sentiment proxies in the month of announcement.9
5.5. Calendar Time Portfolios
The performance of portfolios grouped by the year of 
the ex-date over calendar time is presented in Tables 5.17 
and 5.18. Recall that the evaluation period for firms 
comprising these portfolios is a four year span; two years 
(480 trading days) prior to the ex-date of the spinoff, and 
two years after. Parent firms are added to the portfolio 
at the beginning of this four year period, and deleted from 
the portfolio at the end of the period. Subsidiary firms 
are added to the portfolio when trading in the security 
begins, and deleted two years after the ex-date. In 
contrast to the technique used to analyze the relative 
performance of the Before and After portfolios, returns 
observed over the 90 day pre-announcement period and two 
day event window are included in the analysis.
The data are separated into three calendar time 
portfolios using the year of the ex-date as the criterion 
of portfolio selection. Dates selected as boundaries for 
each of the calendar time portfolios are chosen so as to
9Results of analyses of portfolios created using other 
bull/bear market definitions indicate no clear relationship 
between the timing of the announcement and portfolio 
performance.
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balance the number of firms in each portfolio. Since 
relatively fewer spinoffs occur during the decade of the 
1970's, firms with ex-dates during the 11 year period 
between January 1970 and December 1980 (inclusive) were 
included in the first portfolio (n=36).
The number of spinoffs increased during the 19801s, so 
the eight year period between January 1981 and December 
1988 is divided into two segments. The second calendar 
time portfolio consists of 31 firms that went ex-dividend 
between January 1981 and December 1985, and the third 
portfolio is comprised of 23 firms that have an ex-dividend 
date between January 1986 and December 1988. Naturally, 
firms that have ex-dates after 1988 are not included in the 
third portfolio since sufficient price data is not 
available for these firms. The raw excess annualized 
returns for the calendar time portfolios are larger than 
those observed for the event time portfolios discussed 
above (average excess annualized return = 18.99%). This 
result is not surprising, since the former contain the 
(statistically significant) positive returns that are 
associated with the 90 day pre-spinoff announcement period 
and two day event window, while the latter do not.
The impressive performance of the calendar time 
portfolios is particularly evident in the market-adjusted 
returns, where the return of these portfolios is (slightly) 
less than that of the market for only the 1981-1985
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portfolio using the equal-weighted CRSP index as market 
proxy. For all other portfolios and market proxies, the 
portfolio return is higher than that of the market.
TABLE 5.17
CALENDAR TIME PORTFOLIOS
Panel A
Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns
Annualized Excess Return 
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted 
S&P 500 Adjusted
1970-1980 
Portfolio 
Return 
17.74 
11.20
8.72 
19.63
1981-1985 
Portfolio 
Return 
22.24 
13.44 
-0.95 
21.17
1986-1988 
Portfolio 
Return
17.50 
9.57
11.03 
13.08
Panel B
Estimated Market Model Parameters
1970-1980 Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index CRSP Index
S&P 500 
Index
a
P
0.0004 -0.0001 
0.976 1.105
1981-1985 Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
0.0005
0.927
a
P
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index CRSP Index 
0.0003 -0.0001 
0.902 1.087
1986-1988 Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
S&P 500 
Index 
0.0005 
0.825
a
P
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted 
CRSP Index CRSP Index 
0.0002 0.0001 
0.918 1.037
S&P 500 
Index 
0.0003 
0.825
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TABLE 5.18
Panel A
CALENDAR TIME PORTFOLIOS 
Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p 
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap
Benchmark
1970-1980 Portfolio 
1981-1985 Portfolio 
1986-1988 Portfolio
Treynor's Measure 
Value Equal
Weighted Weighted 
CRSP CRSP
0.182
0.247
0.191
0.161 
0. 205 
0.169
S&P
500
0.191
0.269
0.212
Sharpe's 
Measure 
21.79 
42.33 
46.15
Panel B
Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance 
(R p t “  R ft) =  aP + /3P (R m t “  R ft) +  e pt
1970-1980 Portfolio 
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0143 (2.37*) 0.0388 (0.62) 0.0192 (3.19**
0 1.125 (13.68**) 0.955 (12.71**) 1.107 (13.43**
1981-1985 Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Value-We ighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0076 (1.27) 0.0057 (0.87) 0.0118 (2.02*)
& 0.912 (9.98**) 0.805 (8.21**) 0.716 (10.16**)
1986-1988 Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted S&P
CRSP Index CRSP Index 500
a 0.0118 (0.73) 0.0012 (0.73) 0.0253 (1.66f)
1.065 (11.35**) 1.107 (10.63**) 0.984 (11.16**)
Annualized excess return is higher for the subset of 
firms that have an ex-date between January 1981 and 
December 1985. This likely reflects the effect of the bull 
market of the early-mid 1980's on stock prices in general 
and the fact that the analysis begins in a year (1981) when 
stock prices were depressed. The average market-adjusted 
return is largest for the 1970-1980 portfolio of firms, as 
is the portfolio's level of systematic risk as measured by 
average /3 (Please see Table 5.17, Panel B) across market 
proxies (1.0). Average /3s for the 1981-85 and 1986-88 
portfolios are 0.94 and 0.93 respectively. As a result, 
the 1981-85 portfolio displays superior performance 
relative to the other groupings based on the Treynor 
criterion.
The Sharpe measure of portfolio performance indicates 
that the two portfolios comprised of firms with ex-dates 
during the 1980's have risk-adjusted returns that are 
superior to the portfolio of firms that went ex-dividend 
during the 1970's. Results of an analysis using Jensen's 
measure of portfolio performance are consistent with the 
results reported above; on the whole, the calendar time 
portfolios perform well relative to the market. Each of 
the three portfolios has significantly positive abnormal 
returns when measured against at least one market proxy.
The portfolio formed of firms that went ex-dividend during 
the 1970's appears to be the best performer when evaluated
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against market proxies, consistent with the results of an 
analysis of market-adjusted excess returns.
The strong performance of portfolios consisting of 
spinoff firms over calendar time might be anticipated, 
given the results of the analysis of the Before and After 
portfolios. Since the performance of both these portfolios 
is, in general, not significantly different from that of 
the market, adding the significantly positive returns 
earned over the pre-spinoff period (APE = 2.67%) and the 
event-day window (APE = 3.69%), should boost the 
performance of the calendar time portfolio to significantly 
positive levels.
It appears that an investor who pursues a strategy of 
purchasing spinoff firms two years prior to the ex-date and 
who holds those firms for a four year period can earn 
positive returns relative to holding the market portfolio. 
This is not inconsistent with (semi-strong form) market 
efficiency, of course, since the announcement of a spinoff 
and the ex-date are typically much closer in time than two 
years. Furthermore, much of the positive return is earned 
during the pre-announcement period and on the announcement 
day, so it seems that an investor must have inside 
information to exploit this strategy.
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important - and most consistently 
obtained - result of the spinoff literature is the 
association between an announcement of a spinoff and wealth 
gains for shareholders of the announcing firm. The 
empirical evidence indicates that these wealth gains do not 
come at the expense of the senior security holders. The 
source(s) of these wealth gains has (have) been the subject 
of investigation since this phenomenon was first reported, 
with less than satisfactory results. That is, there does 
not yet exist a generally accepted explanation for the 
wealth gains that accrue to shareholders of firms that 
announce a spinoff.
This work offers (and tests empirically) a new 
hypothesis regarding the positive share price reaction to 
spinoff news. This is the PRNI hypothesis, which suggests 
that the market response to a demerger announcement is 
driven by investor sentiment during the announcement 
period. The PRNI hypothesis is tested by separating a 
sample of spinoff announcements using the criterion of 
market sentiment as a basis for categorization. That is, 
the stock price reaction induced by announcements that take 
place during periods when investors are assumed to be 
optimistic is compared to that observed for announcements 
during pessimistic periods. A result indicating higher
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share price reactions during periods of market optimism 
would be consistent with the PRNI hypothesis.
In fact, when market (return) oriented proxies for 
investor sentiment are applied to segregate the data into 
optimistic and pessimistic groups, in general, the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the groups can be 
rejected. On the other hand, when non-market proxies for 
investor sentiment are used in the analysis, the stock 
price reaction to the announcement of a spinoff is not 
significantly different for the optimistic and pessimistic 
groups. The single exception to the general inconsistency 
of non-market proxies with the PRNI hypothesis is the 
percent change in the index of leading indicators. This 
surrogate for investor sentiment is significantly 
correlated with the return on the market, however. Thus, 
it can be inferred that market-based factors are good 
proxies for investor sentiment.
For the PRNI hypothesis to be acceptable, it must be 
agreed upon that the market return is an appropriate 
representation of investor sentiment and that other proxies 
are not. Given the decision-making heuristics and biases 
that the PRNI hypothesis is predicated on, prior period 
market return seems a natural choice as a proxy for 
investor sentiment. However, it is also possible that 
prior period market return represents some other phenomenon 
entirely, and it is not investor sentiment that drives the
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results reported in Chapter 4 of this study. A final point 
concerning the short-term effects of demergers is that 
positive share price effects are observed even for 
announcements that take place during periods of investor 
pessimism. Thus, although investor sentiment may influence 
the stock price reaction to the announcement of a spinoff, 
it cannot be entirely responsible for the observed 
response.
Another aspect of corporate spinoffs is the long-term 
performance of the shares of these firms. Extant research 
on this issue is scant and has focused on the post-spinoff 
performance of the subsidiary firm. For example, Cusatis, 
Miles, and Woolridge (1991) find that a sample of spun off 
firms outperform a market proxy and a sample of matched 
firms, especially in the second year following the 
distribution date.
The long-term post-spinoff performance of both parent 
and subsidiary firms is examined here. The result of this 
examination indicates that the post-spinoff performance of 
parent and subsidiary firms is not significantly different 
from that of the market (with the exception of that of the 
Parent portfolio relative to the S&P 500 index).
Differences between the results reported by Cusatis, Miles 
and Woolridge and those obtained in this analysis for the 
Subsidiary portfolio can be ascribed to choice of market 
proxy and sampling technique, among other possibilities.
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The relative performance of spinoff firms before and 
after the demerger is also investigated. It is found that 
the risk and market-adjusted performance of these firms 
does not appear to change significantly post-spinoff. 
Therefore, it appears that the separation of the subsidiary 
from the parent firm does not substantially change the 
risk-return characteristics of the whole, on average. Thus 
the long-term effect on shareholder wealth of a corporate 
spinoff appears to be minimal.
Because share price performance is not significantly 
lower post-spinoff, the short term effects of the demerger 
announcement (the significant upward price drift prior to 
the spinoff and the positive returns associated with 
spinoff firms on the announcement day) do accrue to 
investors. As discussed above, investor sentiment may 
influence the share price response to the announcement of a 
spinoff, but cannot be solely responsible for it. Given 
the combination of long-term and short-term wealth effects 
of spinoffs reported in this study, it is possible that 
there exists some additional explanation (other than 
investor sentiment) that is responsible for the wealth 
gains associated with spinoffs.
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